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Presentation of Academic Papers on

Hungary and the United States  
From the Cold War and Ronald Reagan to Present-Day

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On behalf of the Pepperdine School of Public Policy, it has been a delight to work with the Magyar Foundation in our research and production of these papers. As a graduate policy program uniquely devoted to remembering and exploring America's exceptional relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, we are grateful to the Foundation for its support, and sharing our commitment to building the record of the histories of Hungary and the United States.

Pete Peterson  
Interim Dean  
School of Public Policy  
Pepperdine University

The Magyar Foundation of North America thanks and commends the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy for its important academic work contributing to the public record on the historical and present-day aspects of Hungarian freedom and democracy. We particularly want to recognize Pepperdine's important help in establishing the Foundation's Visiting Scholar Program for Hungarian Graduate Students. Presenting these papers is one of the many projects the Foundation is undertaking to enhance the visibility of Hungarian history, culture, and issues of mutual interest.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart  
Executive Director  
Magyar Foundation of North America

*The views expressed in the following papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other individual or organizations.*

**Ronald Reagan's Indispensable Role in Winning the Cold War, Liberating Eastern Europe, and Freeing Hungary from Soviet Tyranny.**

By Robert G. Kaufman

This paper recounts the documented history of Ronald Reagan's indispensable role in winning the Cold War and corrects the growing modern misconception that the collapse of Communism was inevitable or designed by those within the Soviet Union. The paper ties this remarkable history with Hungary, and the subjugation of Eastern Europe, and explains how the West's peaceful victory set the stage for present-day Hungary's path toward more personal and economic freedoms. Lastly, the paper presents my analysis of how President Reagan personally redirected American foreign policy away from containment and détente toward his fundamental belief that a government must respect the natural rights of its peoples before it can be respected on the World stage.

Most Americans rate Ronald Reagan the greatest U.S. President, according to a Gallup Poll taken in December 2011.<sup>1</sup> Credit the American public for displaying far sounder judgement than the preponderance of those hostile to or skeptical about Reagan who dominate the media and the academy. No other Presidents -- with the exception of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln --- have surpassed the achievements of Ronald Reagan, indisputably the greatest American President since World War II, with FDR his only peer in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The remarkable success of Reagan's foreign policy accounts significantly for his lofty ranking, especially the indispensable role he played in defeating the Soviet Union and extending the zone of democratic liberty to Eastern Europe, including Hungary. The collapse of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, that Reagan contributed mightily to, not only signified the end of the Cold War, but also the victory in the titanic struggle between the democratic versus Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism that had scourged the 20<sup>th</sup> century. What historian Paul Johnson called the despotic utopias of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in reality, subjugated, murdered, and unleashed wars; killing tens of millions before the United States belatedly led the coalitions that vanquished them.<sup>2</sup>

In a speech at the Reagan Library on October 23, 2014, Adam Michnik --- the great historian, courageous former dissident, public intellectual, and editor of Poland's largest newspaper --- summed up the towering but provisional legacy of the West's victory in the Cold War. "It turned out much worse than we had hoped but much better than we expected.... It allowed Eastern Europeans for the first time in decades to feel human again."<sup>3</sup> Indeed, no single event over the past 70 years has contributed more to America's security and freedom overall than

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<sup>1</sup> Frank Newport, "Americans Say Reagan is the Greatest President," *Gallup*, February 18, 2011, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/146183/Americans-Say-Reagan-Greatest-President.aspx>.  
<sup>2</sup> Paul Johnson, *Modern Times: the World From the Twenties to the Nineties* (New York: Harper, 2001), 49.  
<sup>3</sup> Adam Michnik, *Reagan Library*, Simi Valley, CA, October 23, 2014.

the collapse of the Soviet Union, that Ronald Reagan proved indispensable in achieving. The demise of the evil empire of the Soviet Union vastly expanded the democratic zone of peace, discrediting statism, tyranny, and collectivism while vindicating the moral and practical superiority of free markets, open societies, and limited government grounded in inalienable individual rights endowed by our creator. For Eastern European nations in general and Hungary in particular, the West's victory in the Cold War afforded these heretofore captive nations the providential chance --- though not the guarantee---to establish durable well-ordered liberty for the first time in their tumultuous histories.

Beware, however, of taking for granted the permanence of this grand achievement. If, as Ronald Reagan presciently warned in his Presidential farewell address, "we forget what we did, we will not know who we are...we have to get back to teaching history based not what's in fashion, but what's important.... We've got to do a better job getting across... that freedom is rare... Freedom is special and rare. It is fragile; it needs protection."<sup>4</sup> The greatest threat to Ronald Reagan's towering legacy lies precisely in forgetting how brave souls fought successfully to win the Cold War, and the salience of this lesson for navigating present and future challenges domestically and internationally. This essay strives to restore our historical memory, vital to ensure that this generation of leaders do not snatch defeat from the jaws of Reagan's victory.

I

Start with dispelling the myths and distortions about how the Cold War ended, especially Ronald Reagan's role in winning it. Revisionist scholars and commentators misrepresent not only the Cold War's essence, but woefully underestimate Reagan's enormous contribution to the

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<sup>4</sup> Ronald Reagan, "Farewell Address: Oval Office," January 11, 1989, *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library*, Simi Valley, Ca.

Soviet Union's demise. Strobe Talbott, a journalist before he became an Undersecretary of State in the Clinton Administration, disparaged the policy of vigilant containment that Truman initiated and Reagan intensified as provocative and unnecessary. In *Time Magazine*, Talbot pronounced that the West won the Cold War because it need not have been fought in the first place. According to a more nuanced and prevalent version of revisionism whose ranks include James Mann, Jack Matlock, Michael Vaisse, and John Patrick Diggins, the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union subsequently collapsed mainly for internal reasons, with Mikhail Gorbachev being the main hero.<sup>5</sup> These revisionists consider Reagan's most important, though secondary, contribution his willingness during his second term to abandon the belligerent policies of his first. According to Beth Fischer, for example, an enlightened and sensible Gorbachev induced Reagan to compromise, thus defusing the spiraling cycle of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union that Reagan's ill-advised hard line policies initially triggered.<sup>6</sup> According to James Mann and Justin Vaisse, Reagan dissociated himself from the hard-liners regnant in his first term and switched with the advent of Gorbachev to a more realistic conciliatory policy of peace.<sup>7</sup>

These revisionists' deconstructions of the Cold War and Reagan's record wither under scrutiny. The Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed precisely because prudent regimes and heroic individuals displayed the stamina, fortitude, and foresight to wage a moral as well as a geopolitical struggle for more than four decades against an evil, totalitarian empire

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<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., John Patrick Diggins, *Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History* (New York: Norton, 2007); James Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War* (New York: Viking, 2009); Justin Vaisse, *Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Jack Matlock, *Superpower Illusions: How Myth and False Ideologies Led America Astray --- and How to Return to Reality* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

<sup>6</sup> Beth Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997).

<sup>7</sup> Vaisse, *Neoconservatism*, 196-7; Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 280-320.



bristling with conventional nuclear weapons. The United States expended much toil, sweat, blood and tears to prevail.

Many heroes of the Cold War deserve acclaim. The Truman Administration devised the successful strategy of and architecture for vigilantly containing the Soviet Union. The preponderance of Truman's Presidential successors and Congress implemented and sustained vigilant containment, while the American people wisely sacrificed for and generously supported it. The Hungarian Freedom fighters of 1956, whom the Soviet Union brutally repressed, stood as shining examples of the moral and physical courage necessary to resist totalitarian tyranny. Equally brave dissidents behind the Iron Curtain such as Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sakharov, and Natan Sharansky bore witness to the criminal nature of the Soviet regime. The Conservative and Neoconservative opposition to President Nixon's, Ford's, and Carter's policies of détente with the Soviet Union, emerging during the 1970s, paved the way for Ronald Reagan's repudiation of détente during the 1980s. The burgeoning conservative movement that William F. Buckley godfathers, shifted the center of gravity of the Republican Party to the South and West, contributing mightily to Ronald Reagan becoming President in the first place. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher inspired Reagan's plan to revive American economic power, collaborating later, too, with Reagan to roll back Soviet power. The seminal Papacy of John Paul, II not only inspired resistance to totalitarianism, but convicted the Soviet regime morally by championing the dignity of the human person ---- a message resonating most powerfully throughout Eastern Europe, especially in Hungary and John Paul II's native Poland. <sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> See, for Example, John O'Sullivan on Thatcher's and Pope John Paul's pivotal roles. John O'Sullivan, *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister: Three Who Changed the World* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2008).

Last but hardly least, Ronald Reagan possessed a unique combination of courage, sound conviction, and political skills to generate overwhelming pressure on the Soviet Union at a pivotal juncture, ultimately impelling Gorbachev --- a decent exception to the miserable rule of Soviet leadership ----to tear down the Berlin Wall and end the Cold War entirely on American terms. Few anticipated this felicitous outcome when Ronald Reagan became President in January, 1981. The 1970s was a dismal decade, with freedom in retreat and collectivism on the rise. Even in the Western democracies, the power, scope, and cost of government expanded voraciously, stifling the incentives for growth and innovation that had propelled the post-War economic boom in the United States. The Arab Oil Boycotts following the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 and the oil shocks of 1978-1979 following the fall of the Shah of Iran ravaged the American and world economy. By the final year of the Carter Administration, the economy had plummeted to post-World War II lows, with inflation reaching 12 percent and interest rates soaring to 21 percent. Meanwhile, defense spending had plummeted to just 4.8% of the GDP, half the amounts that liberal democratic Presidents such as Harry Truman, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson spent to keep America and its democratic allies in Europe and Asia free.<sup>9</sup>

The Iranian takeover of the American embassy in November 1979 encapsulated the enervating self-doubt pervading the democratic West as militant Islamists defied a hapless Carter Administration for 444 days with impunity. The Carter Administration's botched rescue mission of April 24, 1980 acidly but accurately dubbed "The Debacle in the Desert" -- too small to succeed while large enough to fail conspicuously --- intensified the perception of American power on the wane. Following his infamous Camp David Retreat in the Summer of 1979, Carter feasted on steroids the image of American inexorable decline, admonishing the American

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<sup>9</sup> Patrick Glynn, *Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 287-91.

people to overcome their malaise while learning to accept gracefully the diminished capacity for the U.S. to influence events abroad.<sup>10</sup>

Correspondingly, the 1970's witnessed a huge surge in the military might and global assertiveness of the Soviet Union, confident that the correlation of forces had changed in its favor. Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter all accepted the permanence of the Soviet Union, or what Columbia University Professor Marshall Shulman, Carter's principle advisor on the Soviet Union called "Learning to Live with an Authoritarian (Soviet) regime" rather than undermining it. By their reckoning, the Soviet Union was on the rise, the United States in decline, making long term détente with Moscow a necessity as well as a virtue. These American Presidents envisaged Soviet domination of Eastern Europe --- including Hungary --- irreversible --- rather than the root cause of the Cold War that the U.S. should and could strive indefatigably to reverse.<sup>11</sup>

Consider these two emblematic examples of western democracies defining deviancy down during the era of détente, accepting the unacceptable. In the summer of 1975, President Ford refused to meet with Alexander Solzhenitsyn on the advice of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Kissinger's eventual replacement as National Security Council Chairman Brent Scowcroft. Kissinger considered Solzhenitsyn's three-volume *Gulag Archipelago* chronicling the grotesque and systematic horrors of the Soviet regime under Stalin a great moral event. He even brought copies to President Ford. When, however, some of Kissinger's aides suggested that the Administration uses the *Gulag* to generate strong support for a more robust foreign policy, delegitimizing Communism and challenging the Soviet Union's domination of Eastern Europe,

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<sup>10</sup> Steven Hayward, *The Real Jimmy Carter* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2004), 157-68.

<sup>11</sup> Robert G. Kaufman, *Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press), 245-8.

Kissinger refused, dismissing that alternative Reagan would embrace as unattainable and excessively provocative. Kissinger did not want to risk the upcoming Helsinki Summit, scheduled for late July 1975, which the Administration expected to conclude a major agreement with Soviet autocrat Leonid Brezhnev. In the long run, the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accords had results unanticipated by its most staunch defenders and fiercest critics, who considered Helsinki a sellout bolstering the Soviet regime's domination of Eastern Europe. Eventually, brave dissidents would invoke these provisions as a sword and a shield to undermine the legitimacy of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European vassals. At the time, however, the Soviet Union and the government of West Germany --- ardently engaging in Ostpolitik, a version of détente far more conciliatory to the Soviets than any American version at its softest --- envisaged the Helsinki accords as ratifying post-War Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, making it irreversible.<sup>12</sup>

Consider, too, the case of Hungarian Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty, a staunch critic of Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism, to whom the United States gave asylum in 1971. Previously, Cardinal Mindszenty lived in the US embassy in Hungary for 15 years, having received refuge there during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Nixon and Kissinger considered the Cardinal's uncompromising opposition to Communism an obstacle to détente, resolving instead to accept the conditions of the Communist Hungarian government --- a satellite to the Soviet Union. Nixon's and Kissinger's propitiation of the Hungarian regime severely demoralized Hungarian dissidents struggling to achieve religious and political freedom.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, the Nixon and Ford Administration had little faith in the efficacy of, or attach much importance to, promoting human

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 291-294.

<sup>13</sup> NARA, Nixon Presidential Materials, Staff, National Security Files, Country Files Europe, Box 667.

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rights behind the Iron Curtain --- especially at the expense of détente with the Soviet Union which trumped all countervailing considerations.

Even worse, the Carter Administration spent its first three years mainly criticizing the human rights shortcomings of America's less repressive authoritarian allies while downplaying the more serious and systematic human rights abuses of America's Communist foes. President Carter sought to transcend what he called in his May 1977 speech at Notre Dame University, "our inordinate fear of communism" by conciliating our Communist adversaries to a degree that even Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford in their most euphoric moments over détente never imagined.<sup>14</sup> Carter's propensity to propitiate Communist rulers applied especially to Hungary. In 1977, for example, President Carter naively decided to "return" to the Hungarian satellite regime, "The Holy Crown of Hungary," also known as "The Holy Crown of St. Stephen." Carter thereby acknowledged the permanence and bolstered the legitimacy of an illegitimate, repressive regime, because the Crown symbolized Hungarian Sovereignty. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who once proclaimed infamously that the Soviet Union and the United States shared similar aspirations and values --- led the U.S. delegation that "transferred" the Crown in a ceremony at the rotunda of the Hungarian Parliament on January 6, 1978.<sup>15</sup>

Historian Martin Malia sums up best the decade of feckless détente under Nixon, Ford, and Carter: "For the West, Détente was a gradual way to transcend the Cold War; for the East, it was a gradual way to win it."<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Peter G. Bourne, *Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Post Presidency* (New York: Scribner's, 1997), 289.

<sup>15</sup> Kaufman, *Henry M. Jackson*, 351-53.

<sup>16</sup> Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991* (New York: Free Press, 1994), 376.

II

Reagan repudiated both the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policy of détente and Carter’s even more conciliatory version of it. He understood more clearly than anyone else in American politics the evil essence of Soviet Communism and how to defeat it. He considered the liberation of Eastern Europe in general, and Hungary in particular, as necessary if not sufficient conditions for winning the Cold war. He understood more clearly than even his staunchest supporters the vulnerability of the Soviet Union to sustained economic, military, moral and political pressure. His full-throated defense of political and economic freedom also restored America’s prosperity, self-confidence, and capacity for exercising world leadership.

Reagan not only cherished freedom, but also insisted that preserving and extending it required unremitting vigilance. Or as he frequently put it: “Freedom is not more than one generation from extinction. We did not pass it on to our children in the bloodstream. It must be fought for, protected, and handed on down for them to do the same, or one day we will spend our sunset years telling our children and our children’s children what it was once like in the United States when men were free.”<sup>17</sup> Throughout his political career, Reagan warned indefatigably of the perils first of Nazi then Soviet totalitarianism. He denounced appeasement of Hitler as “a Suicidal Dogma.” He said of the fight to vanquish Nazi Germany that “never in the history of man had the issue of right and wrong been so clearly defined, so much so that it makes one question how anyone could have been neutral”. Reagan credited his hero Winston Churchill –

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<sup>17</sup> Ronald Reagan, “Losing Freedom By Installments,” address to the Long Beach Rotary Club, June 6, 1962, Ronald Reagan Presidential Papers, *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library*, Simi Valley, CA, box 43.

the archenemy of appeasing Hitler or Stalin --- "for doing more than any other man to preserve civilization during its greatest trial."<sup>18</sup>

After World War II, Reagan saw Soviet totalitarianism as the gravest and existential threat to freedom. "The real fight with this totalitarianism belongs properly to the forces of liberal democracy, just as the battle did with Hitler's totalitarianism. There is really no difference except for the cast of characters."<sup>19</sup> Reagan thus considered the Soviet regime a malevolent Leninist tyranny with unlimited aims and ambitions, not a traditional great power as Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger deemed it, nor a defensive one driven to aggression by the arrogance of American power as Carter deemed it. Reagan reckoned that no reliable substitutes existed for muscular American power effectively to deter and eventually to defeat the Soviet Union. He defined the objective of American grand strategy not just negatively as resisting totalitarian tyranny, but positively promoting freedom, prosperity, and democratic institutions. Rejecting the enervating pessimism of his predecessors, Nixon, Kissinger, and Carter, Reagan insisted confidently that America's best days lay ahead so long as the United States returned to its first principles grounded in free markets, limited government, American exceptionalism, and a Judeo-Christian moral/cultural system.<sup>20</sup>

In January 1981, Reagan came to the Presidency determined to vanquish rather than merely contain or accommodate Soviet tyranny.<sup>21</sup> He succeeded magnificently, generating

<sup>18</sup> Ronald Reagan, "Speech at the Westminster War Memorial," Fulton, Mo., November 16, 1990, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA.

<sup>19</sup> Ronald Reagan, "How Do You Fight Communists," *Fortnight*, 1951, 13.

<sup>20</sup> For a comprehensive overview of Reagan's foreign policy strategy which he formulated between 1975 and 1979 after leaving the Governorship of California and before coming President, see Ronald Reagan, *Reagan in His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan That Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America*, ed. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson (New York: Free Press, 2001), 23-218.

<sup>21</sup> See, e.g., Peter Schweizer, *Reagan's War: the Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle and His Final Triumph over Communism* (New York: Doubleday, 2002).

overwhelming pressure on the Soviet Union, giving it no other prudent option but to capitulate. President Reagan laid down the gauntlet at his first Press Conference when he said that Leninist ideology impels the Soviet Union unremittingly to lie, cheat, and steal to achieve its ultimate objective of global domination.<sup>22</sup> Henceforth, he continued unceasingly to use public diplomacy to discredit and delegitimize the Soviet regime, despite encountering intense opposition to his policies at home and abroad. In June 1982, Reagan proclaimed that “the West will not contain communism, it will transcend communism. We will not bother to denounce it, we will dismiss it as a sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose final pages are now being written.”<sup>23</sup> Speaking before the Council of National evangelicals in March 1983, Reagan again shocked the foreign policy establishment, infuriated Soviet tyrants, and inspired imprisoned Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky, calling the Soviet Union an evil empire.<sup>24</sup> Finally, Sharansky wrote, “The leader of the free world has spoken the truth --- a truth that burns in each and every one of us.”<sup>25</sup>

Negatively, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Party also took notice of Reagan’s renewed emphasis on human rights in its dealings with totalitarian Communist regimes. In 1983, for example, the committee lamented that “during the past two years, the American side ... has informally indicated that they would observe our behavior regarding dissidents. This “curiosity” has emerged in other areas as well, and falls just short of intervention in our domestic issues.”<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ronald Reagan, “Commencement Address at Notre Dame,” May 17, 1981, *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library*, Simi Valley, CA.  
<sup>23</sup> Ronald Reagan, “Address to the British Parliament,” June 8, 1982, *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library*, Simi Valley, CA.  
<sup>24</sup> Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Annual Convention of National Evangelicals,” Orlando, Fla, March 8, 1983, *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library*, Simi Valley, CA.  
<sup>25</sup> Natan Sharansky, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 138.  
<sup>26</sup> National Archives of Hungary (MOL KÜM TÜK 4-19 00836)



Though envisaging public diplomacy as a key component in his grand strategy, Reagan rejected the notion that soaring rhetoric and soft power could substitute for hard power and decisive action. He realized the impact of his strong words depended on resolute deeds to amplify their effect. Accordingly, Reagan secured a massive modernization of the American military, doubling the size of the American defense budget, and badly straining the Soviet economy while wiping out the military advantage the Soviet Union had so painstakingly achieved during the 1970s. Facing down skeptics even within his own administration and defying the potent nuclear freeze movements that had taken to the streets and intimidated many statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic, Reagan persuaded the NATO allies to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing intermediate-range ballistic missile to counter the Soviet SS-20 missile in Europe.<sup>27</sup>

Despite intensive diplomatic pressure culminating in the Soviet walkout from arms control talks, Reagan refused to budge, ultimately compelling the Soviet Union to accept his Zero Option as the basis for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty of 1987, eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons. Reversing three decades of arms control theology that derided the desirability and feasibility of ballistic missile defense, Reagan unveiled the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which Soviet Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet military feared enough to propose unprecedented concessions to eliminate it.<sup>28</sup>

Facing down the opposition of his own National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, Reagan would not sacrifice SDI even for Gorbachev's promise of sharp reductions in Soviet

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<sup>27</sup> Robert G. Kaufman, "The First Principles of Ronald Reagan's Foreign Policy," *Heritage Foundation*, First Principles Series No. 40, November 1, 2011, 1-20.

<sup>28</sup> Originally a skeptic but later a convert to Reagan's robust approach to Soviet totalitarianism, Secretary of State George Shultz tells this story authoritatively. George Schultz, *Triumph and Turmoil: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribners, 1993) 453-780.

nuclear arsenals as a quid pro quo. Ultimately, Reagan's perseverance induced the Soviet Union to make concessions on arms control that it had routinely and cavalierly rejected during the previous decade of détente. Correspondingly, Reagan intensified economic pressure on the Soviet regime by cutting American trade and credits to the USSR, restricting Soviet access to American technology, and collaborating with Saudi Arabia to reduce the price of oil, depriving the oil-exporting Soviets of desperately needed hard currency. In the same vein, the Reagan Administration supported opposition groups it dubbed "Freedom Fighters" resisting Soviet clients in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.<sup>29</sup>

Nor, unlike Nixon, Ford, and Carter, would Reagan accept the permanence of the Soviet Union's subjugation of Eastern Europe in general or Hungary in particular. In National Security Directive 54, signed on September 2, 1982, Reagan determined "that the primary long-term U.S. goal in Eastern Europe is to loosen the Soviet hold on the region and thereby facilitate its eventual reintegration into the European community of nations." He directed U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe to aim in the short term at

Encouraging more liberal trends in the region, furthering human and civil rights in Eastern European countries, reinforcing the pro-Western orientation of their peoples, lessening their dependence on the USSR, facilitating their association with the free nations of Western Europe, undermining the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact... and encouraging more private market-oriented development of their economies.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Ronald Reagan, National Security Decision Directive (hereafter NSDD) 54, September 2, 1982, *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library*, Simi Valley, CA.

Hungary's admission to the International Monetary Fund offers a prime example of the positive effects of the Reagan Administration's long term goal to encourage more private market oriented development in the Eastern Bloc, with salutary results. Hungary's membership in the IMF --- requiring the Hungarian regime to reform its nearly bankrupt and unsustainable economy --- facilitated the emergence of Hungarian capitalism so essential in the long term to restoring Hungary's freedom and prosperity<sup>31</sup>. Reminiscing in 2011 about the importance Reagan attached to freeing Eastern Europe, Former Secretary of State George Shultz told the Hungarian Ambassador that the President "especially admired Hungary, because the Hungarian people stood for freedom in 1956." Schulz expounded that "the people of Hungary always inspired Reagan, because the Hungarians never gave up, even after their uprising was brutally put down by the Soviets."<sup>32</sup>

Accordingly, President Reagan's National Security Directive 75, signed on January 17, 1983, made taming and transforming of the Soviet regime the object of American grand strategy.<sup>33</sup> From start to finish, Reagan strove implacably to achieve his goal of winning the Cold War by applying relentless, comprehensive, political, economic, and military pressure on the Soviet Union and its vassals abroad.

### III

A rigorous, balanced, analysis of Reagan's actual rather than imagined record eviscerates revisionists' claim that Reagan became a soft-liner during his second term, accounting for his

<sup>31</sup> Jacques de Larosière, "The 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Hungary's joining the IMF", presentation at the conference "Convergence of Hungary and the International Financial World", Budapest, November 15, 2002. [http://www.asmp.fr/fiches\\_academiciens/textacad/larosiere/hungary.pdf](http://www.asmp.fr/fiches_academiciens/textacad/larosiere/hungary.pdf)

<sup>32</sup> Remarks by Ambassador Eleni Tsakopoulous Kounalakis, "The Legacy of Ronald Reagan," Pazmany Peter University, Budapest, Hungary, February 24, 2011.

<sup>33</sup> Ronald Reagan, NSDD 75, January 17, 1983, *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library*, Simi Valley, CA.

success in dealing with Gorbachev. True, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher perceived sooner and more clearly than most --including President Nixon or Secretary of State Henry Kissinger --- that Gorbachev was a different type of Soviet leader. When circumstances changed during Reagan's second term, he adjusted his policies --- but not the premises underlying them. Reagan responded positively to changes in the Soviet regime during Gorbachev's tenure, beginning in 1985. Bear heavily in mind, nevertheless, that the Soviet Union agreed in the final analysis to end the Cold War not on its terms, but Ronald Reagan's.

Contrary to what revisionists claim, American pressure on the Soviet regime did not abate at any point during the Reagan presidency, despite his view that engaging Gorbachev could facilitate the implosion of the regime. Reagan would not give an inch either on SDI or on the Zero Option calling for the elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. After waging an energetic public relations campaign to pressure Reagan to change his mind, Gorbachev capitulated. American defense spending continued to rise steadily during Reagan's second term, peaking at \$302 billion in 1988 (6.6 percent of the GDP). The Reagan Administration also continued to aid freedom fighters, draining Soviet resources in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.

Nor, despite the advent of Gorbachev, did Reagan relent on his assault on the moral legitimacy of the Soviet regime. Reagan rebuffed multiple efforts of his so-called more realistic advisors such as Colin Powell to tone down his criticism of Communism in general and his denunciation of the Berlin Wall as the symbol of totalitarian tyranny. In June 1987, Reagan famously exhorted Gorbachev to tear down the wall as proof that he truly represented a different type of Soviet leader:

In the 1950;s, Khrushchev predicted: "We will bury you." But in the West today, we achieved a level of prosperity and well-being unprecedented in all human history.

In failure, technological backwardness, declining standards of health, even want of the most basic kind --- too little food. Even today, the Soviet Union cannot feed itself. Even today, the Soviet Union cannot feed itself. After four decades, then, there stands before the entire world one great and inescapable conclusion. Freedom leads to prosperity. Freedom replaces ancient hatreds with comity and peace. Freedom is the victor. ... There is one change that the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would cause dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Come here to the gate! Mr. Gorbachev, Open the Gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!<sup>34</sup>

Peter Robinson, a former Reagan speechwriter and current fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institute, put it best, describing Reagan's electrifying speech as "a summons of such power and clarity that many who heard him felt as if they has suddenly regained consciousness. The Berlin wall address represented a call to awaken."<sup>35</sup>

Reagan's understanding of himself also utterly confounds the revisionist interpretations of his motives and policies as more conciliatory and dovish during his second term. Summing up his foreign policy legacy to students at the University of Virginia on September 16, 1988, he

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<sup>34</sup> Ronald Reagan, "Speech at the Berlin Wall," June 12, 1987, *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library*, Simi Valley, California.

<sup>35</sup> Peter Robinson, "Four Words that Moved the World: "Tear Down This Wall," *Wall Street Journal*, June 8, 2012, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142052702303753904577454081041366916>.

welcomed the improvement in Soviet-American relations, but urged Americans “to keep our heads down” and “keep our skepticism” because “fundamental differences remain.”<sup>36</sup> He attributed that improvement to his policy of firmness, not conciliation:

Plain talk, strong defenses, vibrant allies, and readiness to use American power when American power was needed prompted the reappraisal that the Soviet leaders have taken in their previous policies. Even more, western resolve demonstrated that the hard line advocated by some within the Soviet Union would be fruitless, just as our economic success had set a shining example.<sup>37</sup>

Reagan contrasted his policies with the conciliatory policies of his predecessors during the 1970s that he deemed utterly unavailing:

We need to recall that in the years of détente we tended to forget the greatest weapons that democracies have in their struggle is public candor: the truth. We must never do this again. It is not an act of belligerence to speak of the fundamental differences between totalitarianism and democracy; it is a moral imperative.... Throughout history, we see evidence of adversaries negotiating seriously with democratic nations when they know democracies harbor no illusions about their adversary.<sup>38</sup>

Brave dissidents behind the Iron Curtain affirm Reagan’s self-assessment as indefatigably bound and determined to defeat Soviet Communism rather than learn to live with it. Hungarian Janos Horvath observed in this vein that “Ronald Reagan was the President I could best be on the same

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<sup>36</sup> Ronald Reagan, “Remarks in a Question and Answer Session at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville,” December 16, 1988, *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library*, Simi Valley, CA,  
<sup>37</sup> Ibid.  
<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

page with among all seven American Presidents... I personally knew." Reagan made Horvath "realize that the Soviet Union and Communism in general is not as stable as it seems."<sup>39</sup>

Likewise, Soviet leaders understood more clearly than revisionists that Reagan remained a hardliner who never changed his basic disposition towards Soviet Communism. In his widely heralded *The End of The Cold War: 1985-1991*, Robert Service recounts the analysis of an exasperated working group of high ranking officials including Soviet foreign Minister Shevardnaze and Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin accusing Reagan of "trying to exhaust the USSR by both drawing it into regional conflicts and intensifying the arms race." Reagan "treated every non-socialist country and region as belonging to the sphere of America's vital interests. He used a variety of methods. He was assisting counter-revolutionary insurgencies in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and Cambodia. He had deployed American forces against Granada, Lebanon, and Libya. He used economic levers to keep the rest of NATO and other allies in line. He was flexible in reaction to changing situations around the world. When popular discontent grew in Salvador, Haiti, and the Philippines, America gave its blessing for the removal of dictatorial right-winged governments. "According to this Soviet working group, "this combination of methods proved that the Reagan administration was a practitioner of 'neoglobalism'".<sup>40</sup>

It strains plausibility to the breaking point, moreover, to give Gorbachev more credit for ending the Cold War than Reagan's policy of unremitting vigilance for winning it. The restoration of American power that Ronald Reagan's words and deeds catalyzed gave the Soviet Union little choice but to take the risk of choosing a reformer such as Gorbachev, who

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<sup>39</sup> Janos Horvath, "Ronald Reagan, az '56-os forradalom csodálója", *Magyar Nemzet*, June 12 2004, <http://mno.hu/velemeney/ronald-reagan-az-56os-forradalom-csodalolja-643467>  
<sup>40</sup> Robert Service, *The End of the Cold War: 1985-1991*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2015), 200-201.

recognized that the Soviet Union could no longer compete against a rejuvenated self-confident United States unless it liberalized its policies at home and pursued a more conciliatory policy abroad.

Nor were Gorbachev or the Hungarian “reformer Communists” genuinely democratic. On the contrary, both aimed only to reform Communism, not abolish it. As Hungarian Party leader Karoly Grosz put it in his infamous speech at the 1988 Party Congress: We must step up to the hostile reactionary forces (i.e. democrats). If we can do that, we’ll preserve our values, security, and order, we’ll get past any economic hurdles, and we’ll create a new, more up to date, and more effective Hungarian socialism.<sup>41</sup>

Gorbachev’s regime and Communism in Eastern Europe began to implode under the cumulative effect of decades of U.S. containment, Reagan’s confrontational policies intensifying American pressure as a pivotal juncture, and the mortal contradictions inherent in the Soviet system.<sup>42</sup> Whereas Gorbachev and Hungarian “reformer Communists” did not intend the breathtaking collapse of Communism that his domestic reforms unwittingly unleashed, Ronald Reagan expected and dedicated his political life to achieving this outcome.<sup>43</sup> Granted, Gorbachev earns our just admiration for his decency, utterly unique among Soviet leaders, for not resorting to the use of force to stave of the Soviet Union’s demise as all of his predecessors likely would have strived to do. Gorbachev thus rendered an important but secondary contribution to the main hero of the Cold War’s endgame: Ronald Reagan.

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<sup>41</sup> “Pictures and Citations from the Transitional Period”, *Europai Utas*, Vol. 20 No. 2-3 (Summer 2009), 5.

<sup>42</sup> For an authoritative account of how surprised Gorbachev was by what he unleashed, see Jonathan Haslam, *Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), 328-92.

<sup>43</sup> For the definitive account of Reagan’s lifelong war against Communism, see Paul Kengor, *Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism* (New York: Harper, 2006).



The more conciliatory policies that Reagan's critics tried as an alternative prolonged rather than hastened the Soviet Union's demise, the liberation of Eastern Europe, and the restoration of Hungary's freedom. Under Nixon, Ford, and Carter, détente elicited nothing but an acceleration of the Soviet Union's relentless, comprehensive military buildup and the intensification of its insatiable global expansionism. Conversely, Ronald Reagan's indefatigable exploitation of the Soviet Union's vulnerabilities convinced Soviet leaders that the USSR could no longer out build or out bully the United States as it had done during the 1970s in an era of détente. Former USSR Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh and other major ex-Soviet officials have cited Ronald Reagan's military buildup --- and SDI in particular --- as vital initiatives expediting the Soviet Union's benign collapse.<sup>44</sup> In his magisterial study of the Cold War based on recently released Soviet archives, Professor Jonathan Haslam offers the definitive conclusion:

In a critical sense, whether one likes to admit it or not... the Reagan buildup in counterforce systems, the anticommunist zeal within the Reagan administration, and the obsession with space based defense played a key role in the unravelling of the Soviet security system across the board.<sup>45</sup>

Remarkably, Reagan achieved the collapse of the Soviet Union without violence because he understood that weakness begets danger and resolution bolsters deterrence when it comes to dealing with totalitarian rogue regimes.

America's victory in the Cold War and the expansion of the democratic zone of peace to Eastern Europe, including Hungary, owed equally to the resurgence of American economic

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<sup>44</sup> Richard Pipes, "Misinterpreting the Cold War: The Hardliners Were Right," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No.1 (January/February 1995): 154-160.  
<sup>45</sup> Haslam, *Russia's Cold War*, 399.

power that Ronald Reagan's free market pro-growth policies. In contrast to his predecessors during the 1970s then, and President Obama now, Reagan gave primacy to cutting taxes, reducing the rate of growth in domestic spending and deregulating the economy and the energy sector, unleashing the dynamism and creativity of the private sector that statism in all its manifestations suffocates.<sup>46</sup>

#### IV

Ideally, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire --- events highly contingent and dependent on human volition --- would have refuted forevermore, the plausibility of any form of historical determinism as a political idea. Human progress is possible, not inevitable, never final, and always reversible depending on what we do or do not do. History will never end by human contrivance alone. The West's great triumph in the Cold War should have inoculated free peoples for generations to come for succumbing to the fallacy of moral equivalence between freedom and tyranny in any guise. The vast expansion of liberty and prosperity that the collapse of the Evil Empire of the Soviet Union unleashed should have demonstrated beyond a shred of doubt, that the best practical regime rests on a trinity of free enterprise, limited government, and biblical moral values. The smashing success of Ronald Reagan's strategy for winning the Cold War should have convinced more generations than one of the prudence of eternal vigilance to deter, and, if necessary, to defeat --- sooner rather than later; at the lowest possible cost and risk --- the devils always lurking around the corner in international relations even in the best of times.

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<sup>46</sup> For the most comprehensive and sure handed account of the Reagan Presidency in all its dimensions, including Reaganomics, see Steven F. Hayward, *The Age of Reagan: The Conservative Counterrevolution, 1980-1989* (New York: Crown, 2009).

Nearly a generation after the end of the Cold War, the world remains considerably freer, safer, and more prosperous than before. That holds especially true for the Eastern European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including Hungary. The significant danger of 20<sup>th</sup> century totalitarianism has been diminished. Communism has irrevocably lost its force and appeal. It is, moreover, highly unlikely that either the United States or most of our democratic allies will lose their freedom any time soon. We could pay no greater tribute to the heroes of the Cold War such as Ronald Reagan and Hungarian Freedom fighters than by heeding the lessons of who won the Cold War and why.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> The author wishes to thank Brittany Tayloe and Gergely Rajnai for their invaluable assistance in researching, editing, augmenting the footnotes, and proofreading.

## **From a Follower to a Trendsetter: Hungary's Post-Cold War**

### **Identity and the West**

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The paper attempts to make sense of recent developments in Hungary's relationship with the EU and the US by explicating the logic behind the formation of its post-Cold War identity. The paper's central theoretical argument derives from social identity theory (SIT) in social psychology which argues that social groups strive for positive distinctiveness and provides concrete hypotheses concerning the identity management strategies that groups use to enhance their relative position. Extrapolating the identity management techniques predicted by SIT to international politics, states may enhance their relative standing by imitating more advanced states (strategy of social mobility), trying to displace the higher-ranked state (strategy of social competition), or finding a new arena in which to be superior (strategy of social creativity). The paper argues that Orban's government post-2010 steps in domestic and foreign policy can be conceptualized as attempts to redefine Hungary's identity by moving away from the strategy of social mobility pursued since the end of communism towards the strategy of social creativity.

As multiple observers have noted, after Viktor Orban's center-right Fidesz party and its coalition partner, the Christian Democratic People's Party, returned to power in the spring of 2010, Hungarian-American and Hungarian-EU relations have been complicated by a number of issues, including Hungary's political/constitutional reforms, the Middle Eastern refugee crisis and a policy towards Russia. According to one recent analysis, the period since 2010 has become "the most debated period of Hungarian foreign policy" in the quarter century since the end of communist rule.<sup>1</sup>

Tensions between Hungary and the West are especially puzzling since Hungary has been widely acknowledged as the "ideal reform country": a steadfast follower of the West and one of the trailblazers in Eastern Europe's transition to markets and liberal democracy.<sup>2</sup> Orban himself famously started his political career in 1989 by demanding the Soviet military's withdrawal from Hungary at the rally celebrating the reburial of Imre Nagy, the hero of the 1956 anti-Soviet uprising. "If the country had a single iconic moment of liberation, it was Orban who delivered it."<sup>3</sup> Why after a quarter century after jubilation over its "return to Europe" does Hungary emerge as the first EU country to distance itself from the post-1989 liberal consensus?

The paper attempts to make sense of recent developments in Hungary's relationship with the EU and the US by explicating the logic behind the formation of its post-Cold War identity. The paper's central theoretical argument derives from social identity theory (SIT) in social

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<sup>1</sup> Ferenc Gazdag and Laszlo J. Kiss, "Foreign Policy: Towards the Center or the Peripheries?" in John O'Sullivan and Kalman Pocza eds. *The Second Term of Victor Orban: Beyond Prejudice and Enthusiasm* (The Danube Institute, 2015), 108.

<sup>2</sup> Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, "The Splintering of Postcommunist Europe," *Journal of Democracy*, 26, 1, 2015: 90 (quote).

<sup>3</sup> James Traub, "The Regression of Viktor Orban," *Foreign Policy*, October 31, 2015.

psychology which argues that social groups strive for positive distinctiveness. The paper then presents hypotheses concerning the identity management strategies that groups use to enhance their relative position.<sup>4</sup> Extrapolating the identity management techniques predicted by SIT to international politics, countries may enhance their relative standing by imitating more advanced states (strategy of social mobility), trying to displace a higher-ranked state (strategy of social competition), or finding a new arena in which to be superior (strategy of social creativity).

The paper argues that Orban’s government post-2010 steps in domestic and foreign policy can be conceptualized as attempts to redefine Hungary’s identity by moving away from the strategy of social mobility pursued since the end of communism towards a strategy of social creativity. It highlights major factors leading to the change in the identity management strategy and then analyzes some of the key ingredients of the post-2010 social creativity efforts. Second, the paper introduces SIT and a typology of strategies by which states can improve their international standing. Section three applies these theoretical insights to a case study of Hungary’s evolving international identity since the end of the Cold War.

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<sup>4</sup> For applications of social identity theory to international relations, see Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity,” *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 299-52; Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy,” *International Organization*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 77-109; Anne L. Clunan, *The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence. Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests* (Baltimore: the John Hopkins University Press, 2009); Larson and Shevchenko, “Status-Seekers. Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,” *International Security* Vol. 34, No 4 (Spring 2010), pp. 63-95 and ‘Managing Rising Powers: The Role of Status Concerns,’ in T,V, Paul, Deborah Welch Larson and William C. Wohlfoth eds., *Status in World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 33-57.

## SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

According to Social Identity Theory, a well-developed and experimentally tested theoretical framework in social psychology, groups strive to achieve a positively distinctive identity relative to other similar groups.<sup>5</sup> SIT posits that people derive part of their identity from membership in various social groups—nation, ethnicity, religion, political party, gender, or occupation.<sup>6</sup> Because membership reflects back on the self, people want their group to have positive identity.<sup>7</sup>

Groups evaluate themselves relative to a reference group that is similar or slightly superior.<sup>8</sup> Groups strive for positive distinctiveness—to be not only different but better besides.<sup>9</sup> When the reference group ranks higher on criteria that are important to the group's identity, it may decide to pursue an identity management strategy--social mobility, social competition, or social creativity. Groups may improve their status by emulating a higher status group, competing with it for dominance, or establishing their excellence in a different area that does not compete

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<sup>5</sup> For the seminal works on social identity theory, see Henri Tajfel, "The Psychological Structure of Intergroup Relations," in Tajfel ed., *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (London: Academic Press, 1978); Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," in William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, eds., *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (Monterey, Ca.: Brooks/Cole, 1979), pp. 33-47; Henri Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Ad F.M. Van Knippenberg, "Intergroup Differences in Group Perceptions," in Henri Tajfel, ed., *The Social Dimension: European Developments in Social Psychology*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes* (London: Routledge, 1988).

<sup>6</sup> Jonathan H. Turner, "The State of Theorizing in Sociological Social Psychology: A Grand Theorist's View," in Peter J. Burke, ed., *Contemporary Social Psychological Theories* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 359.

<sup>7</sup> Tajfel, "The Psychological Structure of Intergroup Relations," pp. 63-64; and Tajfel and Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," p. 40.

<sup>8</sup> Rupert Brown and Gabi Haeger, "'Compared to What?' Comparison Choice in an International Context," *European Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (February 1999), pp. 31-42.

<sup>9</sup> Tajfel, "The Psychological Structure of Intergroup Relations," pp. 83-86.

with the dominant group.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, states may enhance their relative standing by imitating more advanced states, trying to compete with the higher-ranked state using the existing criteria of the assessment of status among states, or finding a new arena in which to be superior.

If the boundaries of higher-status groups are permeable, a lower-status group may conform to the norms of an elite group to gain acceptance, pursuing a strategy of *social mobility*.<sup>11</sup> For states, this means adopting the values and practices of the dominant states. Since the end of the Cold War, Eastern and Central European states have adopted political reforms and capitalism to be admitted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), organizations that symbolize identity as part of the West.<sup>12</sup> However, the problem with a social mobility strategy is that it goes against a tradition of diplomatic autonomy, risks losing distinctive identity, and implies a humiliating relationship of tutelage.<sup>13</sup> To illustrate with an example popular in domestic discussions of Russia’s foreign policy objectives, Russia under Putin refused “to be a second Poland in Europe,” a rising regional power that successfully embraced a strategy of social mobility. It aspired to be nothing less than a great power staking its own unique position in global affairs and defending its distinct civilizational identity.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Tajfel and Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.”  
<sup>11</sup> Tajfel, “The Psychological Structure of Intergroup Relations,” pp. 93-94; and Naomi Ellemers, Ad van Knippenberg, and Henk Wilke, “The Influence of Permeability of Group Boundaries and Stability of Group Status on Strategies of Individual Mobility and Social Change,” *British Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (September 1990), pp. 233-246.  
<sup>12</sup> Judith G. Kelley, *Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
<sup>13</sup> R. P. Dore, “The Prestige Factor in International Affairs,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 1975), pp. 190-207.  
<sup>14</sup> Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin*, 326-328; Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 43.



If elite group boundaries are impermeable, the lower-status group may strive for equal or superior status through a strategy of *social competition*.<sup>15</sup> Social competition aims at besting the other state in established areas of superiority.<sup>16</sup> In international relations this strategy is historically associated with the behavior of established or aspiring great powers. Indicators of social competition include arms racing, rivalry over spheres of influence, military displays, military intervention against a smaller power, or acting as a spoiler, preventing cooperative efforts by others from succeeding.

Social groups do not have to compete to attain higher status. In social creativity, which is the third strategy explicated by SIT, the lower-status group seeks positive distinctiveness “by redefining or altering the elements of the comparative situation.”<sup>17</sup> This may be done by reframing a negative characteristic as positive (illustrated by the African American 1960s slogan “Black is beautiful”), or finding a new dimension on which their group is superior.<sup>18</sup> To illustrate, although Maoists blamed Confucianism for China’s social and economic backwardness, the Chinese regime now uses traditional Chinese thought to enhance China’s “soft power”.<sup>19</sup> Since 2004, China has established hundreds of Confucian Institutes in various

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<sup>15</sup> Naomi Ellemers, “The Influence of Socio-structural Variables on Identity Management Strategies,” *European Review of Social Psychology*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1993), pp. 27-57.

<sup>16</sup> John C. Turner, “Social Comparison and Social Identity: Some Prospects for Intergroup Behavior,” *European Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 1975), pp. 5-34.

<sup>17</sup> Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin, eds., *Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (Second Edition, Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1985), 19.

<sup>18</sup> Gérard Lemaire, “Social Differentiation and Social Originality,” *European Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1974), pp. 17-52.

<sup>19</sup> Peter Hays Gries, “Identity and Conflict in Sino-American Relations,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., *New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 325.

countries to promote Chinese language and culture.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, China's nineteenth century "self-strengtheners" adopted the slogan of "Chinese learning as the essence, western learning for practical use (usually abbreviated as *ti-yong*)," suggesting that traditional Chinese culture had valuable features, even if the West had made advances in technology and military power.<sup>21</sup> Elites in late developing countries often develop ideologies portraying how their traditional cultural values of spirituality, community, and justice are superior to Western rationalism, individualism, and materialism, exemplified by German romantic conservatism, nineteenth century Russian Slavophilism and the Eurasianism strand of Russian intellectual thought.<sup>22</sup> In a more recent example, defying the "End of History" thesis, the East Asian elites advanced the concept of "Asian values"—stressing that their societies are more harmonious, orderly, and communitarian than the liberal West.<sup>23</sup>

A lower-status group may also identify an alternative dimension of comparison, for example, "their group may be better at reasoning, but ours is more creative."<sup>24</sup> Similarly, social creativity may also enable a state to achieve prestige on a different criterion for evaluation, such as a developmental model, culture, or promotion of norms. Unlike social competition, social

<sup>20</sup> Yongjin Zhang, "The Discourse of China's Soft Power and its Discontents," in Mingjiang Li ed., *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 51, 60n.

<sup>21</sup> Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 24-26; and Joseph Fewsmith, "The Dengist Reforms in Historical Perspective," in *Elite Politics in Contemporary China* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), 20-21.

<sup>22</sup> Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought*, trans. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 166; Tim McDaniel, *The Agony of the Russian Idea* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 24-25, 44; Dmitry Shlapentokh, "Dugin Eurasianism: A Window on the Minds of the Russian Elite or an Intellectual Ploy?" *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (September 2007), pp. 215-236.

<sup>23</sup> Fareed Zakaria, "A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1994).

<sup>24</sup> Rupert J. Brown and Gordon F. Ross, "The Battle for Acceptance: An Investigation into the Dynamics of Intergroup Behaviour," in Tajfel, ed., *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 155-78.

creativity does not try to upend the status hierarchy, merely to achieve preeminence on its own criteria. For example, Europeans have described the European Union as a “normative power” promoting democracy, peace, rule of law, and human rights through conditionality in enlargement policy and development policy, complementing the “hard power” exerted by the United States.<sup>25</sup> In another example, in the wake of 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis China pursued status as a “responsible great power.” China’s new grand strategy led to the formation of “strategic partnerships” with all major powers, engagement with multilateral institutions, adherence to arms control treaties, and promotion of regional economic cooperation.<sup>26</sup> Beijing’s efforts to be seen as a responsible great power reassured other states and enhanced China’s global stature.<sup>27</sup> Signs that a state is pursuing social creativity include advocacy of new international norms, regimes, institutions, or a developmental model. The essence of social creativity is the attempt to stake out a distinctive position, emphasizing the state’s unique values or contributions. Social creativity may be manifested in major diplomatic initiatives or activism by charismatic leaders such as Nehru, de Gaulle, Gorbachev, or, more recently, Brazil’s Lula and Turkey’s Erdogan.

As with social mobility, a social creativity policy requires the approbation of the dominant group for the state’s status to be recognized. Failure by the higher-status group to recognize social creativity efforts shows disrespect and such injury to dignity and prestige is

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<sup>25</sup> I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2002), pp. 235-58.

<sup>26</sup> Avery Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), Ch. 6.

<sup>27</sup> David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/2005), pp. 64-99.

likely to provoke resentment.<sup>28</sup> The higher-status group is more likely to acknowledge the out-group's accomplishments if it believes that its own position is legitimate and secure.<sup>29</sup>

The typology described above may help to explain changes in the post-Cold War Hungarian foreign policy as well as its choice among alternative international identities. The strategies of social mobility, social competition, and social creativity are ideal types in which the causal logic and behavioral implications are brought out more clearly to facilitate one's understanding. Sometimes states combine different elements of each type. Nevertheless, each state is driven by its own set of dynamics so they are distinguishable. Regardless, it is consistent that social mobility entails conformity to the norms of the established powers. Social competition is associated with rivalry or obstruction. Social creativity aims at achieving a positive image while maintaining a distinctive identity.

### HUNGARY'S POST-COLD WAR SEARCH FOR IDENTITY

#### *Hungary's Historic Identity and the West*

Since the Hungarian tribes converted to Christianity in the year 1000, pro-Western orientation has been crucial for Hungary's international identity. Hungary's security and international status depended on establishing alliances with the wealthier western and northern neighbors. The 1222 adoption of the Golden Bull—the first constitution in mainland Europe—highlighted Hungary's political and legal achievements. Hungary's status, however, of an

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<sup>28</sup> Tajfel, "The Psychological Structure of Intergroup Relations," pp. 96-97; and Rupert J. Brown and Gordon F. Ross, "The Battle for Acceptance: An Investigation into the Dynamics of Intergroup Behavior," in Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, pp. 155-178; Wolf, "Respect and Disrespect in International Politics."

<sup>29</sup> Itesh Sachdev and Richard Y. Bourhis, "Power and Status Differentials in Minority and Majority Intergroup Relations," *European Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 1-24.

advanced sovereign European power suffered dramatic setbacks due to the brutal Mongol and Ottoman invasions in the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries. Hungarian moments of glory were overwhelmed by national tragedies such as the carnage of the 1526 battle of Mohacs after which the Kingdom of Hungary fell under the Ottoman rule. When the Ottomans were expelled in the end of the seventeenth century, Hungary became a province in the Habsburg Empire.

The Hungarian historical narrative focuses on both injury and insult, prominently featuring instances when the country was disrespected, abandoned, betrayed and unduly punished by the West.<sup>30</sup> When the Hungarian republic was proclaimed in the wake of the 1848-1849 rebellion against the Habsburg Empire, the Western powers chose not to provide material support for it during the subsequent Austrian-Hungarian war. As a result, instead of independence Hungary had to settle for a status of a junior partner in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (also known as the Dual Monarchy). Hungary gained full independence only after the end of World War I, but the price of it was exorbitant. In 1920, the Treaty of Trianon imposed by France and England punished Hungary for being on the losing side of World War I by surrendering more than two thirds of its territory and more than half of its pre-war population to Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Austria and Italy (with 3.5 million of ethnic Hungarians living in historical Hungarian villages finding themselves outside the country's borders) and thus drastically diminishing Hungary's status and influence in Europe. Inter-war Hungary was surrounded by a hostile "Little Entente" of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia with few

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<sup>30</sup> Laszlo Maracz, "Pressing the Reset Button on US-Hungary Relations," in Giles Scott-Smith ed., *Cite europeenne/European Policy, Volume 50: Obama, US Politics, and Transatlantic Relations: Change or Continuity* (Brussels, Belgium: Peter Lang AG, 2012), 170-171.

opportunities of independent foreign policy.<sup>31</sup> While Hungary mattered in the pre-1914 European politics, after Trianon it clearly did not.<sup>32</sup>

Resentment over this national humiliation was embodied in the Hungarian demands for the revision of the terms in the League of Nations and in the popular response to Trianon (chanted by Hungarian students in the beginning of their classes during interwar years) “*Nem, nem, soha!*” (No, no never!) A determination to regain Hungary’s “historical lands” was an important factor in Hungary’s fateful decision to ally with the Axis powers during World War II, thus once again placing itself on the losing side of history.<sup>33</sup> Hungary participated in the 1941 invasions of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and was responsible for the deportation and killing of more than half a million Jews. At the February 1945 Yalta conference Hungary was once again “punished” by the West by being included into the Soviet sphere of influence. The West acquiesced to the imposition of the hardline Stalinist regime in late 1940s and to the Soviet brutal suppression of the 1956 Hungarian uprising.<sup>34</sup>

While Hungary remained part of the Soviet empire after the failure of the 1956 revolution, it managed to carve out an independent space for economic and political experimentation, a rare accomplishment in the communist bloc. The New Economic Mechanism, were market oriented de-centralizing reforms introduced by the Hungarian leadership presided by Janos Kadar in 1968, and produced noticeable increases in people’s living standards and

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<sup>31</sup> Geza Jeszenszky, “Hungary’s Foreign Policy Dilemmas After Regaining Sovereignty,” *Society and Economy*, Vol. 29, 2007, No. 1: 44.

<sup>32</sup> James Traub, “Hungary’s 500-Year-Old Victim Complex,” *Foreign Policy*, October 28, 2015.

<sup>33</sup> Lonnie R. Johnson, *Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Federigo Argentieri, “Hungary: From Postcommunism to Populist Nationalism,” in Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane Leftwich Curry eds., *Central and East European Politics. From Communism to Democracy* (Third Edition, Lanham: Roman and Littlefield, 2015), 295.

<sup>34</sup> Charles Gati, *Failed Illusions. Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006).

created a relatively free-wheeling, consumer-based economy unmatched by other members of the Soviet socialist camp. Hungary opened up to foreign investment and loans. In addition, since the mid-1960s, based on Kadar's principle "he who is not against us is with us," Hungary's political system was consistently less repressive and more inclusive than in other communist regimes.<sup>35</sup> Hungary's trail-blazing successful integration of planned economy and markets (nicknamed "goulash communism") became an important inspiration for the Chinese market-oriented reforms undertaken since late 1970s by Deng Xiaoping and his followers.<sup>36</sup>

Integration into the West and conforming to the criteria for membership in the key Western institutions became Hungary's overarching goal after the end of the communist rule.<sup>37</sup> In 1996 it was admitted to the OECD, in 1999 it entered NATO and in 2004 it became a member of the EU. Hungary's Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi compared Hungary's accession to the European institutions to "a homecoming": "the return to the family [it] had been forcibly excluded from for too long."<sup>38</sup> In the early 1990s Hungary also presided over the establishment of the Visegrad framework for cooperation (Visegrad Group, or V4) with its "companions in historical distress" (Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia) based on the commitment to preventing rivalry and ensuring stability in Central Europe.<sup>39</sup> While it fell short of the NATO's spending target of at least 2 percent of its GDP on defense, Hungary overall proved to be an active member of NATO and the EU, participating in a number of peace missions. Like most of the new NATO members, Hungary also positioned itself as a staunch "Great Atlanticist"

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<sup>35</sup> Argentieri, "Hungary: From Postcommunism to Populist Nationalism," 293, 299.

<sup>36</sup> Joseph Fewsmith, *Dilemmas of Reform in China. Political Conflict and Economic Debate* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994); Yan, Sun. *The Chinese Reassessment of Socialism, 1976-1992* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

<sup>37</sup> Gazdag and Kiss, "Foreign Policy," 114.

<sup>38</sup> Janos Martonyi, "Europe, Central Europe and Hungary: 2014, a Year of Anniversaries," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 66, No. 3, May 2014: 361

<sup>39</sup> Jeszenszky, "Hungary's Foreign Policy Dilemmas," 48-49.

advocating close cooperation with the US on security, economic and political matters.<sup>40</sup> The US and Hungary closely and successfully cooperated in the area of law enforcement. They established the International Law Enforcement Academy, where police officers from Eastern Europe and post-soviet Eurasia trained to fight global organized crime.<sup>41</sup> Hungary sided with the US over war in Iraq, defying France and Germany by joining the “Coalition of the Willing” and became in January 2003 one of the signatories of the “Letter of Eight” that offered full support for American actions.<sup>42</sup> Hungary’s Special Forces contributed to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan being involved in both military and reconstruction objectives.<sup>43</sup>

### *Social Mobility and Its Limits*

Hungary’s initial euphoria over “return to Europe” and its social mobility progress was tempered, however, by the rise of the popular discontent over the results of post-1990 transition to democracy and markets which became associated with mass unemployment and rising social inequality. While Hungary was never exposed to the full pain of “shock therapy,” Hungarians, accustomed to the highest living standards in the former Soviet bloc, felt the consequences of the dismantlement of the socialist welfare state sharply. Global financial crisis together with the Hungarian socialist government’s irresponsible economic policy brought the country to the brink of financial collapse in 2009. According to a Pew Research Center poll in the fall of 2009, 72 percent of Hungarians surveyed believed that they were better off economically under

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<sup>40</sup> Katarzyna Pisarska, “From Great Atlanticists to Great Europeans? The Impact of Obama’s Foreign Policy in Central Europe,” in Giles Scott-Smith ed., *Cite europeenne/European Policy, Volume 50: Obama, US Politics, and Transatlantic Relations: Change or Continuity* (Brussels, Belgium: Peter Lang AG, 2012), 153-168.

<sup>41</sup> Eleni Kounalakis, *Madam Ambassador: Three Years of Diplomacy, Dinner Parties, and Democracy in Budapest*, (New York: The New Press, 2015), 166.

<sup>42</sup> Maracz, “Pressing the Rest Button,” 172-173.

<sup>43</sup> Peter Wagner, Peter Marton, “The Hungarian Military and the War on Terror,” *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, no. 2, 2014:107-120.



socialism.<sup>44</sup> The public was also increasingly disillusioned by the corruption accompanying the transition such as privatization of the most profitable parts of the Hungarian economy by former communist *nomenklatura*. There was also a growing resentment against powerful foreign companies accused of exploiting the country. When it was leaked to the press in 2006 that Prime-minister Gyurcsany's socialist government had systematically lied about economic data to cover the fact that Hungary's budget deficit stood at 10 percent, riots were triggered by "angry and disillusioned voters" leading ultimately to Gyurcsany's resignation in 2009 and a crushing defeat of his party in 2010 elections.<sup>45</sup> "In Central Europe, and particularly in Hungary, where enthusiasm towards the West was very strong during the Cold War, faith in capitalism has almost evaporated, as the gap in the standard of living and the quality of life between the western and eastern half of Europe has hardly narrowed since the fall of the Berlin Wall...unlike twenty five years ago, there is little confidence in a bright future, even less in the European institutions, including the common currency," lamented Geza Jeszenszky, Hungary's foreign minister in 1990-1994, writing in early 2015.<sup>46</sup>

While the fact that such sentiment arose in Central Europe, widely perceived as "the only region to have redeemed Francis Fukuyama's "End of History?" prediction,"<sup>47</sup> was by itself striking, Hungary's disillusionment with the Western developmental model was by no means unique. Since the end of the 1990s, disappointment with the poor developmental record of many transitional economies and the Soviet successor states in particular, together with concerns about weak and failing states brought the issues of state-capacity, institutional quality and state-

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<sup>44</sup> Kounalakis, *Madam Ambassador*, 118.  
<sup>45</sup> Argentieri, "Hungary: From Postcommunism to Populist Nationalism," 305-307.  
<sup>46</sup> Geza Jeszenszky, "Central Europe in the New World Disorder," *Hungarian Review*, January 13, 2015.  
<sup>47</sup> Mungiu-Pippidi, "The Splintering of Postcommunist Europe," 88.

building to the forefront of academic and policy debates that increasingly challenged neoclassic economics orthodoxy.<sup>48</sup> A quarter century after the publication of “The End of History?” Fukuyama himself views the global performance of democracy as disappointing. According to him, “it is the failure to establish modern, well-governed states that has been the Achilles heel of recent democratization transitions.... democracies have not been able to keep up with their citizens’ demand for high-quality government services. This has led, in turn, to the de-legitimation of democracy as such. Conversely, the fact that authoritarian states like China and Singapore have been able to provide such services has increased their prestige relative to that of democracy in many parts of the world.”<sup>49</sup>

Hungary’s social mobility was also complicated by its historic dependence on Russia for most of its natural gas imports. Hungary’s foreign policy was significantly influenced by Russia’s growing assertiveness in the former Soviet space and by its energy politics in Europe. The socialist governments of Peter Medgyessy and Ferenc Gyurcsany responded to Moscow’s growing influence and power by reviving traditional economic ties with Russia and seemingly acquiescing to Moscow’s desire to turn Hungary into a major hub for gas transit and distribution in central Europe, and a key supporter in the construction of the South Stream and Blue Stream pipelines.<sup>50</sup> Hungary’s willingness to accommodate Russia was criticized on the grounds of making Hungary vulnerable to Russia’s political pressure, undermining Europe’s goal of energy diversity and aiding and abetting Russia’s attempt to re-establish its “zone of privileged interests” in the former Soviet space. For example, Hungary supported pro-Russian candidate

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<sup>48</sup> See, *inter alia*, Francis Fukuyama, “The Imperative of State-Building” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 2004): 17—31 and *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Cornell University Press, 2004).

<sup>49</sup> Francis Fukuyama, “Why is Democracy Performing So Poorly?” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 26, no. 1 (January 2015): 12.

<sup>50</sup> A. Orban, *Power, Energy, and the New Russian Imperialism*, (Westport: Praeger, 2008)

Viktor Yanukovich during the 2005 Ukrainian presidential elections and refrained from criticizing Russian actions at the time of 2008 Russo-Georgian War.<sup>51</sup>

Hungary's social mobility strategy was further compromised by the Euro-skepticism born out of the pain of the euro crisis and the growing perceptions of the EU's inability to engage in efficient decision-making to restore economic growth in Europe. In addition, the great recession undermined the stability and legitimacy of the global status hierarchy. The role of Wall Street and seemingly lax US financial regulation in creating the crisis threatened the legitimacy of US global financial leadership, as well as the liberal capitalist model, and contributed to the widespread perception that the US was a declining power.<sup>52</sup>

Finally, the consensus on social mobility strategy was shattered by the Obama administration's effort to "reset" relations with Russia, inaugurated in February 2009. The term "reset" implied that the Obama administration was jettisoning aspects of President Bush's foreign policy that were most objectionable to Russia, such as wooing countries in the post-Soviet space or placing missiles and radars in former members of the Warsaw Pact. In September 2009, the Obama administration decided to put on the back burner one of the most irritating issues for Moscow—deployment of US missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic—in favor of a four-phases system in which the first phase would consist of smaller missile interceptors based on ships and aimed at Iranian missiles.<sup>53</sup> While Hungary was not part of the missile defense project, it was an integral part of the overall security concept advanced by

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<sup>51</sup> Maracz, "Pressing the Reset Button," 172-176.

<sup>52</sup> Stephen M. Walt, "The End of the American Era," *The National Interest*, (November/December 2011): 6-16; Christopher Layne, "This Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and *Pax Americana*," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2012, pp. 203-213.

<sup>53</sup> Peter Baker, "Obama Reshapes a Missile Shield to Blunt Tehran," *The New York Times*, September 18, 2009.

it. Since “reset” with Russia was not accompanied by Washington’s strategic reassurance of its Central European partners, the Obama’s administration decision was interpreted by Budapest as a major departure from US policy in Eastern Europe since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, fueling concerns about the ability of the transatlantic alliance to stand up to Russia’s growing geopolitical ambitions. The conclusion reached was that “Hungary could not rely fully on its most important strategic allies, the US and NATO.”<sup>54</sup>

*Embracing Social Creativity*

In SIT terms, the Orban coalition’s attempt of redefining Hungary’s international identity can be interpreted as a move from social mobility to social creativity. Orban’s view of Hungary’s identity rests on the primacy of national sovereignty, strong and efficient state, national pride and dignity, affirmation of Christian values and cultural specificity. As he emphasized during the January 2012 acrimonious European parliamentary debate on Hungary’s political reforms,

Our ideas are Christian and are built on the responsibility of the individual; we think that national sentiment is important and positive; and we regard family as the token for the future. It may be that many think differently about these things, but that does not mean that this point of view is not European. We may be a minority in Europe, but that does not make our view non-European and we are free to stand by this opinion.<sup>55</sup>

Liberal multiculturalism and mass immigration threatens ethnic balkanization. “We do not want to see a significant minority among ourselves that has different cultural characteristics and background. We would like to keep Hungary as Hungary,” warned Orban after the 2015

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<sup>54</sup> Maracz, “Pressing the Reset Button,” 177 (quote); Pisarska, “From Great Atlanticists to Great Europeans,” 159-160.

<sup>55</sup> Quoted in Balint Ablonczy, “The Struggle for Sovereignty,” in *The Second Term of Victor Orban*, 61-62.

*Charlie Hebdo* attacks in Paris.<sup>56</sup> In the fall of 2015, as the Syrian refugee crisis intensified, Hungary ordered the construction of barbed-wire topped fences on the Hungarian border with Serbia and Croatia (both non-EU countries), making crossing Hungarian borders without proper authorization a crime.<sup>57</sup>

The redefined version of Hungarian identity appeals to the feelings of victimhood and the desire for the resurrection of Hungarian greatness. Tellingly, the first vote of the Fidesz controlled parliament was to adopt a law establishing the Day of National Unity to be observed on June 4, the day of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon (the first official commemoration of the treaty since the end of WW II). The commemoration of the national tragedy was supposed to bring together all Hungarians, including ethnic Hungarians living abroad who were soon allowed for the first time in nearly a century to obtain Hungarian citizenship and to vote in Hungarian elections.<sup>58</sup> The preamble of the new Hungarian constitution adopted in April 2011 was criticized for attempting to absolve the country from the responsibility for the prosecution and killing of the Hungarian Jews by stating that the country's "self-determination" was lost on March 19, 1944, the day the Germans occupied Budapest (in retaliation for the Hungarian attempts to conduct secret peace talks with the Allies). The statue erected next to Hungarian parliament in 2014 to commemorate the occupation of Hungary by Germany in 1944 depicts the Archangel Gabriel (representing Hungary) about to be viciously attacked by the Imperial Eagle (Nazi Germany). The key message of the emerging new "national narrative" is that Hungary was neither the culprit in WWII, nor its loser. Rather, it was the innocent victim of foreign great

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<sup>56</sup> Quoted in Mitchell A. Orenstein, Peter Kreko, and Attila Juhasz, "The Hungarian Putin? Viktor Orban and the Kremlin Playbook," *Foreign Affairs*, February 8, 2015.

<sup>57</sup> Margit Feher, "Migrant Crisis Threatens Europe's Stability, Hungary leader Warns," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 29, 2015.

<sup>58</sup> Kounalakis, *Madam Ambassador*, 85-86.

powers. Orban’s government has also invested in the promotion of the historical narrative depicting Hungary as a Christian force saving Europe from Muslim invaders.<sup>59</sup>

After coming back to power in 2010, Orban called for rethinking of the relationship between European integration and national sovereignty.<sup>60</sup> Hungary should no longer view itself as a compliant student of the Western educators. It should be genuinely sovereign. “We cannot be successful if we can only be servants in our own country, if we have no independence. National sovereignty is a fundamental question,” emphasized Orban in his 2015 State of the Nation address.<sup>61</sup> Multiple post-2010 confrontations with Brussels over Hungary’s macroeconomic management, judicial and political reforms led Orban to publicly compare directives from Brussels to pre-Gorbachev dictates from Moscow.<sup>62</sup> “Our message to Brussels: More respect to Hungarians,” proclaimed the Fidesz party’s billboards during the 2014 electoral campaign.<sup>63</sup>

Orban’s government rejected the EU’s demands for austerity measures as a condition for a 2009 \$25.1 bln. bailout package by the IMF, EU and World Bank designed to save the country from defaulting on the massive debt accumulated by its predecessors. Instead, it implemented “unorthodox measures” designed to increase revenue such as additional taxes on banks and nationalization of the earlier privatized segments of the pension system. It also riled the West by protecting the interests of large Hungarian companies while attempting to minimize foreign

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<sup>59</sup> Traub, “Hungary’s 500-Year- Old Victim Complex”; Kounalakis, *Madam Ambassador*, 113—115, 232-233  
<sup>60</sup> Gazdag and Kiss, “Foreign Policy,” 119-120.  
<sup>61</sup> “The Next Years Will be About Hardworking People,” Viktor Orban’s State of the Nation Address, February 27, 2015 <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-speeches/the-next-years-will-be-about-hardworking-people>  
<sup>62</sup> Ablonczy, “The Struggle for Sovereignty,” 59-60.  
<sup>63</sup> Krisztina Than, “PM Orban Calls for Autonomy for Ethnic Hungarians Beyond Borders,” Reuters, May 10, 2014.

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economic influence in the country.<sup>64</sup> In August 2013, Hungary paid off the remaining bailout debt ahead of schedule and called for the IMF to close its Budapest office.<sup>65</sup>

Orban and his followers insist that Hungary's domestic politics and foreign policy should be driven by national interests and pragmatism, not by abstract values and norms. Orban's party's "electoral revolution", inaugurating "a new era of national politics"-- two-thirds majority received in the 2010 parliamentary elections-- empowered it to introduce a range of legislative measures and constitutional changes designed to reform Hungary's political system in the direction of the majoritarian democracy—the foundation of the strong and efficient state and a fix to the problems with Hungarian governance in Orban's view. As Orban predicted in 2009 discussing his preferences for Hungary's constitutional order, "a large governing party will emerge in the center of the political stage [that] will be able to formulate national policy, not through constant debates but through a natural representation of interests."<sup>66</sup>

In his July 2014 speech delivered to ethnic Hungarians in Romania and his February 2015 State of the Nation address, Orban spoke about the decline of the liberal Western model of political and economic development underscored by the 2008 financial crisis. He called for "breaking away from dogmas and ideologies recognized in Western Europe" and basing the Hungarian statehood on "national foundations". The goal of creating an efficient state capable of making a nation successful and globally competitive requires adopting political and economic institutions that might not conform to Western liberal democratic standards, argued Orban citing examples of Singapore, China, India, Turkey and Russia.

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<sup>64</sup> Kounalakis, *Madam Ambassador*, 252-253

<sup>65</sup> Andrew MacDowall, "Illiberal Democracy: How Hungary's Orban is Testing Europe," *World Politics Review*, December 18, 2014.

<sup>66</sup> Quoted in Miklos Bankuti, Gabor Halmai and Kim Lane Scheppele, "Disabling the Constitution," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 23, No. 3, July 2012: 145.

A democracy does not necessarily have to be liberal. Just because a state is not liberal, it can still be a democracy...Societies that are built on...principle of liberal democracy will probably be incapable of maintaining their global competitiveness in the upcoming decades and will instead probably be scaled down unless they are capable of changing themselves significantly.<sup>67</sup>

While democracy is definitely worth keeping, Hungary “must let go of everything that has failed us and has broken down.” In contrast to the rest of Europe which “continues to huddle behind the moats of political correctness”, Hungary decided to “let go of the dogma of political correctness.”

We let go of neo-liberal economic policy...we let go of the policy of austerity, just before we were about to share the fate of Greece; we let go of the delusion of the multicultural society before it turned Hungary into a refugee camp, and we let go of liberal social policy which does not acknowledge the common good and denies Christian culture as the natural foundation—and perhaps the only natural foundation—for the organization of European societies.

Hungarian people are by nature politically incorrect—in other words, they have not yet lost their common sense....They want to free themselves from the modern day debt slavery that they were driven into by foreign currency loans. They do not want to see their country thronging with people from different

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<sup>67</sup> “Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s Speech at the 25<sup>th</sup> Balvanyos Summer Free University and Student Camp,” July 26, 2014 <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp>



economic ties with Russia and the Asia-Pacific. Orban, one of Russia's harshest critics in Central Europe in the past, expanded bilateral ties and encouraged Russia to invest in the Hungarian economy. He pursued profitable energy deals with Moscow while avoiding strategic commitments and preserving both security ties with NATO and economic benefits of the EU membership. In January 2014, Hungary signed a long-term agreement with Russia to expand Hungary's single Soviet-era nuclear Paks plant with the construction financed by \$13.33 bln., 30 year loan from Moscow.

The Russian--Ukrainian crisis over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine created new challenges for the Russian vector of "Eastern Opening" policy. Hungary has reluctantly cooperated with the EU on economic sanctions against Russia (by imposing sanctions on Russia, Europe had "shot itself in the foot", stated Orban in August 2014), but at the same time did its best not to alienate Moscow politically. "Hungary is not part of the conflict," emphasized Orban in early March 2014. In fact, during the peak of the crisis, he called for more autonomy for the Ukrainian region which used to be part of Hungary, a statement widely interpreted as supporting the Russian government's accusations of discrimination against national minorities by the new Ukrainian authorities. In early 2015 Hungary negotiated a relatively low rate for gas purchases from Russia over the next few years. After his meeting with President Putin in February 2015, Orban pledged not to support the idea of a European Energy Union (which would reduce Russia's influence on European energy markets) and promised not to provide reverse flows of Russian gas to Ukraine (which could undermine Moscow's ability to apply economic pressure on Kiev). Orban also committed to support building a new pipeline to connect the future Turkish Stream pipeline (backed by Russia to replace the cancelled South Stream pipeline project) to Macedonian,

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Serbian and Hungarian markets.<sup>72</sup> Nevertheless, Hungary clearly does not intend to become once again, a satellite of Moscow. As Orban insists, his policy is not “pro-Russian” but is “pro-Hungarian”.<sup>73</sup>

### *Hungary's Emerging Identity and the West*

As SIT would predict, challenges to the legitimacy of the Western liberal model and the stability of global status hierarchy in the wake of the great recession made the EU and the US less likely to recognize and validate Hungary's social creativity efforts. A number of Hungary's post-2010 laws and policies confronted Western criticism for going against European political standards.<sup>74</sup> In June 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Budapest for the opening of Tom Lantos institute, a human rights organization established to commemorate the late Hungarian –born U.S. congressman who was also the only Holocaust survivor to serve in the US Congress. During this visit Clinton publicly voiced concerns about the independence of the Hungarian judiciary, and Hungary's commitment to a free press, freedom of religion, and governmental transparency.<sup>75</sup> While ultimately the Hungarian government has walked back

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<sup>72</sup> “Hungary Continues Courting Russia and Europe,” *Stratfor*, February 6, 2015; “Hungary Chooses Sides to Meet Its Needs,” *Stratfor*, February 19, 2015; Botond Feledy, Andras Racz, “Letter from Budapest,” Carnegie Europe, June 19, 2015.

<http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=60449>; “Hungary's Rapprochement to Russia and the Importance of the Ukrainian Crisis for Europe,” *Project for Democratic Union*, October 14, 2014 <http://www.democraticunion.eu/2014/10/hungarys-rapprochement-russia-importance-ukrainian-crisis-europe/>

<sup>73</sup> Quoted in MacDowall, “Illiberal Democracy.”

<sup>74</sup> For critical Western assessments of Hungary's post-2010 domestic developments see Jacques Rupnik, “How Things Went Wrong,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 23, No. 3, July 2012: 132-137; Kriszta Kovacs and Gabor Attila Toth, “Hungary's Constitutional Transformation,” *European Constitutional Law Review* 7, 2011: 183-203; Jozsef Bayer, “Emerging Anti-Pluralism in New Democracies—the Case of Hungary,” *Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur Politikwissenschaft*, 42, 2013, 1: 95-110 and Janos Kornai, “Hungary's U-Turn: Retreating from Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 26, no. 3, July 2015: 34-48.

<sup>75</sup> For the American account of Clintons' visit see Kounalakis, *Madam Ambassador*, 170-198.

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some of the controversial political reforms, concerns about the state of Hungarian democracy and rule of law have continued to condition American policy toward Hungary.<sup>76</sup>

The Western political establishment was further shocked by Orban's July 2014 speech embracing the idea of "illiberal state," leading to comparisons with Vladimir Putin and Erdogan.<sup>77</sup> "How can you sleep under your NATO Article 5 blanket at night while pushing "illiberal democracy" by day?" charged Victoria Nuland, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, referring to Hungary in her keynote address to the October 2014 US-Central Europe Strategy Forum.<sup>78</sup>

Despite these tensions in the relationship with the West, Hungary's efforts to redefine its identity found support among other EU members. Orban has been called by some analysts "the most influential European leader after Angela Merkel."<sup>79</sup> For example, Poland, another poster child of post-communist social mobility, recently alarmed the West by its willingness to challenge liberal democratic norms and defy the EU. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of the Law and Justice Party which came to power in Poland in the fall of 2015, is an Orban admirer and his government has emulated some of the Hungarian political reforms.<sup>80</sup> Hungary's tough anti-

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<sup>76</sup> "US-Hungary: Outlook for a Troubled Relationship," [www.visegradgroup.eu](http://www.visegradgroup.eu), November 2, 2015.

<sup>77</sup> Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Putinism," *The Washington Post*, July 31, 2014; Charles Gati, "Putin's Mini-Me. The Mask is Off," *The American Interest*, August 7, 2014.

<sup>78</sup> "US-Hungary: Outlook for Troubled Relationship," [www.visegradgroup.eu](http://www.visegradgroup.eu), November 2, 2015.

<sup>79</sup> "The Rise of Illiberalism. An Interview with Ivan Krastev by Maciej Nowicki," *Aspen Review Central Europe*, No. 3, 2014.

<sup>80</sup> "Poland: Europe's New Headache," *The Economist*, December 5, 2015; Rick Lyman and Joanna Berendt, "As Poland Lurches to Right, Many in Europe Look on in Alarm," *The New York Times*, December 14, 2015; "Poland and the EU: On the Naughty Step," *The Economist*, January 16, 2016.

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immigration stance has unified and invigorated the Visegrad group whose members challenged the EU's migration policy.<sup>81</sup>

In fact, some of the aspects of Hungary's social creativity such as rejection of liberal multiculturalism, are quickly becoming the mainstream of European politics.<sup>82</sup> The November 2015 Paris terrorist acts and the continuing refugee crisis shattered Germany's "welcome culture" approach towards asylum-seekers from the Middle East. As acknowledged by *The Economist*, in the summer of 2015, Germany led by Angela Merkel "presented an inspiring alternative to the small-minded xenophobia of leaders like Hungary's Viktor Orban. Now, after the chaos and trauma of the past six months, Mr. Orban feels vindicated and the chancellor looks increasingly isolated. Germany has tried to lead Europe, but others will not follow."<sup>83</sup> Hungary, a loyal disciple of the West a quarter century ago, has now become a trendsetter in challenging the fundamentals of Western political correctness.

## CONCLUSION

Hungary's creative redefinition of its identity together with its departure from the strategy of social mobility validates the growing doubts about the post-Cold War Western narrative emphasizing the supposed irresistible attraction of the liberal world order to transitional societies. As skeptics point out, the liberal order "never attained the breadth or depth" expected by the West after the Cold War. Western liberal economic policies, a "Washington Consensus" became associated with the societal stresses accompanying transition to markets and increasing vulnerability to global economic volatility. Western approach to domestic and global governance

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<sup>81</sup> "Illiberal Central Europe: Big, Bad Visegrad," *The Economist*, January 30, 2016.

<sup>82</sup> "The Rise of Illiberalism."

<sup>83</sup> "An Ill Wind: In Europe and at Home Angela Merkel's Refugee Policy is Being Blown Away," *The Economist*, January 23, 2016.

suffered a decline “in both effectiveness and legitimacy” making the Western liberal order “progressive less relevant.”<sup>84</sup>

Hungary’s post-2010 relationship with the US and the EU also reminds us that the common distinction between bandwagoning/accommodation and balancing in International Relations theory fails to capture important, if subtle, differences in support or opposition to the dominant power’s foreign policy.<sup>85</sup> Smaller allies and clients will not invariably act consistently with preferences of their more powerful partners because of the need of maintaining a distinctive foreign policy identity. Because of this, the existing Western liberal strategies of engagement and institutional integration should be supplemented by policies and incentives sensitive to states’ deeply embedded desire for positive distinctiveness, respect and recognition.

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<sup>84</sup> Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber, “The Mythical Liberal Order,” *The National Interest* (March/April 2013): 57 (quote), 62 (quote). For the opposite, optimistic view of the liberal order see John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton University Press, 2011).

<sup>85</sup> Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” *International Security*, vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005): 7-45; T. V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005): 46-71.



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**Ronald Reagan elengedhetetlen szerepe a hidegháború megnyerésében, Kelet-Európa felszabadításában és Magyarország szovjet megszállásának megszüntetésében**

Robert G. Kaufman

Ez a tanulmány Ronald Reagan hidegháború megnyerésében játszott elengedhetetlen szerepének történetét taglalja, és helyesbíti az egyre szélesebb körben elterjedt tévhitet, amely szerint a kommunizmus bukása vagy eleve elkerülhetetlen volt, vagy a Szovjetunió politikusainak köszönhető. A tanulmány ezt a folyamatot Magyarország történelmével és Kelet-Európa elnyomásával kapcsolja össze, és bemutatja, hogy a Nyugat vér nélküli győzelme miként alapozta meg a jelen Magyarországnak egyéni és gazdasági szabadság kiterjesztéséhez vető útját. Végül a tanulmányban elemzem azt is, hogy Reagan miként változtatta meg az amerikai külpolitika irányát a feltartóztatás és a déttente felől az általa oly fontosnak tartott elképzelés irányába, miszerint minden kormánzatnak tiszteletben kell tartania a nép alapvető jogait, mielőtt az Egyesült Államok elfogadná a világpolitika legitim aktoraként.

A Pepperdine School of Public Policy részéről nagy öröm volt együtt dolgozni a Magyar Foundation alapítvánnyal a kutatásban és jelen tanulmányok kidolgozásában. Nagyon hálásak vagyunk a Magyar Foundation támogatásáért, mellyel segítette posztgraduális képzésünk egyik programját, célul tűzve ki azt, hogy megemlékezzen és feltérképezze Amerika kivételes szerepét a kelet-európai országokkal kapcsolatos nemzetközi kérdésekben. Szívesen osztozunk az elkötelezettségben, hogy hozzájárulhassunk a Magyarország és az Egyesült Államok kapcsolatára vonatkozó történelmi tényfeltárás gazdagításához.

Pete Peterson  
megbízott dékán  
School of Public Policy  
Pepperdine University

A Magyar Foundation of North America köszönettel és elismeréssel tartozik a Pepperdine University School of Public Policy felé, hogy fontos tudományos munkájával hozzájárult a magyar szabadság és demokrácia múlt és jelenkori történetének tényfeltárásához. Külön köszönjük a Pepperdine Egyetem jelentős segítségét abban, hogy Alapítványunk létrehozhatta a Meghívott Tudós Programot, magyar posztgraduális képzésben tanuló hallgatók számára. Jelen tanulmányok bemutatása a Magyar Foundation számos projektje közül az egyik, amelynek célja, hogy láthatóbbá tegye a magyar történelmet, kultúrát, és az amerikai és magyar szempontból kölcsönös érdeklődésre számot tartható kérdéseket.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart  
Ügyvezető igazgató  
Magyar Foundation of North America



A Gallup 2011. decemberi közvéleménykutatása alapján az amerikaiak többsége Ronald Reagant tartja a legjobb elnöknek<sup>1</sup>. Ez is bizonyítja, hogy az amerikai nép sokkal helyesebben ítéli meg a történelmet, mint a média és a tudományos közeg túlnyomó többsége, akik ellenségesen vagy szkeptikusan közelítik meg Reagan személyét. Nincs más elnök (talán George Washington és Abraham Lincoln kivételével) aki többet ért volna el, mint Ronald Reagan, aki vitathatatlanul a legjobb elnök a 2. világháború óta, és az egész XX. században egyedül Franklin Delano Roosevelttel közelíti meg a teljesítményét. Reagan külpolitikájának kiemelkedő sikere talán a legfontosabb oka annak, hogy ilyen nagyra tartjuk őt, és sikerei közül is kiemelendő az az elengedhetetlen szerep, amit a Szovjetunió legyőzésében és a demokratikus szabadság kiterjesztésében vállalt, jelentős változást hozva Kelet-Európa, így Magyarország történelmébe. Amikor a berlini fal 1989. november 9-én leomlott (ehhez az eseményhez Reagan nagyban hozzájárult), nem csak a hidegháború ért véget, hanem a demokrácia is győzedelmeskedett a náci és a szovjet totalitarizmus felett egy olyan küzdelemben, amely az egész XX. századra rányomta a bélyegét. Amit Paul Johnson a Szovjetunió és a náci Németország „despotikus utópiáinak” nevezett, valójában elnyomást, tömeggyilkosságot, és tízmilliók halálát okozó háborúkat eredményezett egészen addig, amíg az Egyesült Államok vezetésével a szabad világ (kis késéssel) le nem gyűrte azt.<sup>2</sup>

2014. október 23-án Adam Michnik (egy kiváló történész, korábbi szabadságharcos, értelmiségi és Lengyelország egyik legjelentősebb lapjának szerkesztője) a Reagan Könyvtárban remekül összefoglalta a Nyugat hidegháborús győzelmének hatalmas, egészen máig ható jelentőségét:

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<sup>1</sup> Frank Newport: "Americans Say Reagan is the Greatest President," *Gallup*, 2011. február 18. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/146183/Americans-Say-Reagan-Greatest-President.aspx> Letöltve: 2016. január 21. 21:03

<sup>2</sup> Paul Johnson: *Modern Times: the World From the Twenties to the Nineties* (New York: Harper, 2001), 49.

„Sokkal rosszabb lett az eredmény, mint amit reméltünk, de sokkal jobb, mint amire számítottunk... hosszú évtizedek után lehetőséget adott Kelet-Európa népeinek arra, hogy újra embernek érezhessék magukat.”<sup>3</sup>

Valóban, az elmúlt hetven év során egyetlen esemény sem növelte a biztonságot Amerikában vagy javította a szabadság helyzetét a világban oly nagy mértékben, mint a Szovjetunió összeomlása; ez az esemény nem következett volna be Ronald Reagan elnöksége nélkül. A „gonosz birodalmának” bukása jelentősen kiterjesztette a békés demokrácia övezetét, amely elveti az állam túlhatalmát, az elnyomást és a kollektívizmust, ehelyett a szabad piac, a nyitott társadalom és a korlátozott kormányzat eszméit védi, amelyek egyenesen következnek az ember elidegeníthetetlen jogaiból. A Nyugat győzelme a hidegháborúban Kelet-Európa, és különösen Magyarország számára lehetőséget (de nem biztosítékot) adott arra, hogy a korábban megszállt nemzetek történelmük során először kialakítsák a szabadság stabil rendszerét országaikban.

Nem magától értetődő azonban az, hogy ezt a fantasztikus eredményt meg tudjuk-e őrizni. Ronald Reagan is bölcsen felhívta a figyelmet erre elnöki búcsúbeszédében:

„Ha elfelejtjük, hogy mit tettünk, nem fogjuk tudni, hogy kik vagyunk... újra kell tanítanunk a történelmet, nem aszerint, hogy mi divatos éppen, hanem aszerint, hogy mi fontos... meg kell értetnünk a világgal, hogy... a szabadság ritka... A szabadság különleges és ritka. A szabadság törékeny; meg kell védenünk.”<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Adam Michnik: *Reagan Library*, Simi Valley, CA, 2014. október 23.

<sup>4</sup> Ronald Reagan, „Farewell Address: Oval Office,” 1989. január 11, *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library*, Simi Valley, Ca.

Ronald Reagan örökségét legjobban éppen az fenyegeti, ha elfelejtjük, hogy sok bátor ember milyen elkötelezetten harcolt a hidegháború megnyeréséért. Amikor a jelen és a jövő hazai és nemzetközi kihívásaival küzdünk meg, nem szabad megfeledkeznünk arról, hogy a korábbi problémákat miként oldottuk meg. Éppen ezért ez a tanulmány arra törekszik, hogy történelmi memóriánkat felfrissítse, hiszen ez nagyban hozzájárulhat ahhoz, hogy a vezetők új generációja nem veszíti el azt, amit Reagan megnyert.

## I

Először a hidegháború végével kapcsolatos tévedéseket és csúsztatásokat kell helyreigazítanom, különösen azokat, amelyek Reagan szerepével kapcsolatosak. A revizionista tudósok és újságírók nem csak a hidegháború lényegét nem értik meg, hanem elképesztően alábecsülik Reagan hatalmas hozzájárulását a Szovjetunió bukásához. Strobe Talbott (előbb újságíró, majd külügyminisztériumi államtitkár a Clinton-kormány idején) elítélte a feltartóztatás politikáját, amit Truman indított el, és Reagan keményebb formában élesztett újra, mondván, hogy ez a politika provokatív és szükségtelen volt. Talbot a Time magazinban kijelentette, hogy a Nyugat azért nyerte meg a hidegháborút, mert ez egy olyan háború volt, amit meg sem kellett volna vívni, a Szovjetunió saját magától is összeomlott volna. A revizionista történetírás újabb, árnyaltabb változata szerint, amelyet mások mellett James Mann, Jack Matlock, Michael Vaisse és John Patrick Diggins képvisel, a hidegháború és a Szovjetunió vége belső okok miatt következett be, így Mihail Gorbacsov a kor igazi hőse.<sup>5</sup> Ezen revizionista szerzők Reagan sikerét abban látják, hogy második ciklusa során felhagyott az 1984-ig folytatott harcias politikával, így

<sup>5</sup> Lásd például: John Patrick Diggins: *Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History* (New York: Norton, 2007); James Mann: *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War* (New York: Viking, 2009); Justin Vaisse: *Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Jack Matlock: *Superpower Illusions: How Myth and False Ideologies Led America Astray --- and How to Return to Reality* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

lehetőséget adott a változásra. Például Beth Fischer szerint a felvilágosult és racionális Gorbacsov készítette kompromisszumra Reagant, ezzel megálljt parancsolva az Egyesült Államok és a Szovjetunió között egyre élesedő konfliktus ördögi körének, amit Reagan korai külpolitikája idézett elő.<sup>6</sup> James Mann és Justin Vaisse szerint pedig Reagan az első ciklus során befolyásos keményvonalas politikusokat a partvonalra helyezte, és Gorbacsov megválasztása után egy pragmatikus, békülékeny politikát folytatott.<sup>7</sup>

A revizionisták új interpretációja a hidegháborúval és Reagan eredményeivel kapcsolatban igen könnyen cáfolható. A berlini fal 1989-ban azért omlott le, és a Szovjetunió azért omlott össze nem sokkal később, mert több mint négy évtizeden keresztül elkötelezett kormányok és hősiességek kitartóan, bátran és előrelátóan morális és geopolitikai szempontból is keményen küzdöttek egy gonosz, totalitárius birodalom ellen, amely ráadásul nukleáris fegyverekkel is rendelkezett. Az Egyesült Államok rengeteg vért, erőfeszítést, verítéket és könnyeket áldozott a végső siker érdekében.

A hidegháború sok hőse elismerést érdemel. A Truman-kormány dolgozta ki a Szovjetunió sikeres feltartóztatásának stratégiáját. A fáradhatatlan feltartóztatást Truman utódai és a Kongresszus átültette a gyakorlatba, mindeközben az amerikai nép bölcsen áldozatokat hozott és nagylelkű támogatást biztosított ehhez a külpolitikához. A Szovjetunió által brutálisan elnyomott magyar szabadságharcosok 1956-ban megmutatták, hogy milyen bátorság szükséges egy totalitárius diktatúra elleni fellépéshez. Hasonlóan bátrak voltak azok a mozgalmárok (így például Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, Alekszandr Szolzsenyicin, Andrej Szaharov vagy Natan Saranszkij), akik személyesen tapasztalták meg a szovjet rezsim bűnös mivoltát. A Nixon, Ford

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<sup>6</sup> Beth Fischer: *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997).

<sup>7</sup> Vaisse: *Neoconservatism, 196-7*; Mann: *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*, 280-320.

és Carter elnökök által kidolgozott és követett külpolitikai irány mellett, amelynek középpontjában a détente és a békés együttélés állt, a hetvenes évek során olyan konzervatív és neokonzervatív ellenzék nőtte ki magát, amely megalapozta Ronald Reagan későbbi külpolitikáját, amely a détente-tal szöges ellentétben állt. A feltörekvő konzervatív mozgalom, amelynek atyja William F. Buckley volt, a Republikánus Párt súlypontját délre és nyugatra tolt, és ez a változás önmagában is sokban hozzájárult Ronald Reagan választási sikeréhez. A brit miniszterelnök, Margaret Thatcher tevékenysége is inspirációt adott Reagan tervéhez, amelynek lényegi eleme volt az amerikai gazdasági hatalom újjáélesztése, és később maga Thatcher is tevékenyen hozzájárult a szovjetek visszaszorításához. II. János Pál egyedülálló pápasága pedig nem csupán háttérrel adott a totalitárius rendszerekkel szembeni ellenállásnak, hanem lesújtó ítéletet is mondott a szovjet rezsimről azzal, hogy az emberi méltóságot állította tanítása középpontjába. Ez az üzenet leginkább Kelet-Európában, azon belül is Magyarországon és János Pál hazájában, Lengyelországban lelt táptalajra.<sup>8</sup>

Végül, de egyáltalán nem utolsósorban, Ronald Reagan egyedülálló tulajdonságokkal (bátorság, mély meggyőződés, politikai érzék) rendelkezett, amelyek képessé tették arra, hogy hatalmas nyomást helyezzen a Szovjetunióra egy kiemelkedően fontos történelmi pillanatban, ezzel rákényszerítve Gorbacsovot (aki ritka, üdítő kivételt jelentett a szovjet vezetők egyébként borzalmas sorában) a berlini fal lebontására és a hidegháború befejezésére úgy, hogy az Amerikának kedvezzen.

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<sup>8</sup> Lásd például John O’Sullivan írását Thatcher és II. János Pál kulcsszerepéről. John O’Sullivan: *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister: Three Who Changed the World* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2008). Magyarul: John O’Sullivan: *Az elnök, a pápa és a miniszterelnök* (Budapest: Helikon – Heti Válasz, 2010), fordította: Árokszállásy Zoltán.

Kevesen számítottak ilyen szerencsés végkifejletre akkor, amikor Ronald Reagan elnök lett 1981 januárjában. A hetvenes évek komor évtizede után, amikor a szabadság egyre rosszabb helyzetbe került a világban, és a kollektivizmus egyre népszerűbbé és elfogadottabbá vált. Még a nyugati democráciákban is ijesztő mértékben nőtt a központi kormányzat hatalma, mérete és költsége, elfojtva a növekedés és az innováció ösztönzőit; azokat az ösztönzőket, amelyek a 2. világháborút követő gazdasági növekedés motorjaiként szolgáltak az Egyesült Államokban. Az 1973 októberében vívott jóm kippúri háborút követően meginduló olajválság és az 1978-79-es olajárrobbanás, amelyet az iráni sah bukása eredményezett, borzasztó pusztítást végzett az amerikai és a világgazdaságban is. A Carter-kormány utolsó évére a gazdaság a 2. világháború óta nem látott mélységbe került, az infláció 12%-ra nőtt és a kamatok 21%-ig emelkedtek. A hadikiadások jelentősen lecsökkentek, a nemzeti össztermék mindössze 4,8%-át tették ki, ennek kétszeresét költötték védelmi célokra olyan liberális, demokrata elnökök, mint Harry Truman, John Kennedy vagy Lyndon Johnson, akik tudták, mire van szükség ahhoz, hogy Amerika és demokratikus szövetségesei Európában és Ázsiában szabadok maradhassanak.<sup>9</sup>

Az amerikai nagykövetség iráni lerochanása 1979 novemberében jellegzetesen szimbolizálta a demokratikus Nyugat fásult önmarcangolásának következményeit: a harcosszlamisták minden gond nélkül 444 napig dacolni tudtak a cselekvésképtelen Carter-kormánnyal. A Carter-kormány kontár módon végrehajtott mentőakciója 1980. április 24-én (amelyet vitriolosan, de sokatmondóan „sivatagi katasztrófának” becéznek, miután túl kisléptékű volt a sikerhez, de túlságosan látványos ahhoz, hogy nyilvános szégyent okozzon a Nyugatnak) megerősítette azt a percepciót, hogy Amerika folyamatosan gyengül. Hírhedt 1979-es Camp David-i vakációját követően Carter egyre erősebben mutatta a megváltozhatatlanul visszaeső

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<sup>9</sup> Patrick Glynn: *Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 287-91.

Amerika képét, amikor arra hívta fel az amerikai népet, hogy lépjenek túl elkeseredettségükön, és tanulják meg kegyesen elfogadni az Egyesült Államok csökkenő befolyását a világpolitikában.<sup>10</sup>

Az 1970-es évek ennek megfelelően a Szovjetunió hatalmának és globális befolyásának növekedésének jegyében telt, és egyre inkább úgy tűnt, hogy az erőviszonyok a szovjetek szándékainak megfelelően alakulnak. Nixon, Ford és Carter mind elfogadták a Szovjetunió hosszútávú fennmaradásának tényét, vagy, ahogy Marshall Shulman (a Columbia Egyetem professzora, aki Carter egyik legfőbb tanácsadója volt szovjet kérdésekben) fogalmazott, „meg kell tanulnunk a diktatórikus (szovjet) rezsimmel együtt élni”, ahelyett hogy annak felszámolására törekednénk. Érvelésük szerint a Szovjetunió egyre erősebbé, az Egyesült Államok pedig egyre gyengébbé vált, ami nem csak szükségessé, hanem helyessé is tette a déttente hosszútávú folytatását Moszkvával szemben. Ezek az amerikai elnökök a Szovjetunió kelet-európai (így magyarországi) dominanciáját tartósnak és elkerülhetetlennek tekintették, ahelyett, hogy felismerték volna, hogy az elnyomás a hidegháború legalapvetőbb oka, és az Egyesült Államok fáradhatatlanul kell küzdjön azért, hogy azt megszüntesse.<sup>11</sup>

A következőkben két emblemikus példát mutatok be, amelyek érzékeltetik, hogy a nyugati demokráciák milyen deviáns módon fogadták el az elfogadhatatlant a déttente időszakában. 1975 nyarán Ford elnök Henry Kissinger külügyminiszter és Kissinger későbbi utódja, a Nemzetbiztonsági Tanács elnöke, Brent Scowcroft tanácsát követve nem volt hajlandó találkozni Alekszandr Szolzsenyicinnel. Kissinger morális remekműnek tartotta Szolzsenyicin

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<sup>10</sup> Steven Hayward: *The Real Jimmy Carter* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2004), 157-68.

<sup>11</sup> Robert G. Kaufman: *Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press), 245-8. Az amerikai külpolitika különböző korszakairól magyarul lásd: Magyarics Tamás: *Az Egyesült Államok külpolitikájának története* (Budapest: Antall József Tudásközpont, 2014).

háromkötetes művét, *A GULAG szigetvilág*ot, amely érzékletesen írja le a groteszk és rendszerszerű borzalmakat, amelyeket Sztálin alatt a Szovjetunió népe el kellett viseljen. Még adott is néhány példányt Fordnak. Amikor azonban Kissinger tanácsadói azt javasolták, hogy a Gulag szigetcsoport segítségével szerezzen széleskörű támogatást egy keményebb külpolitika követéséhez, amelynek része a kommunizmus deligitimálása és a Szovjetunió kelet-európai uralmának megkérdőjelezése, Kissinger nemet mondott, elvetette ezt a lehetőséget, miután véleménye szerint elérhetetlen és túlságosan provokatív lett volna. Érdekes módon épp ez a fajta külpolitika hozta meg a sikert Reagan idején. Kissinger azonban nem akarta kockáztatni a helsinki folyamatot, amely 1975 júliusában indult el, és amely révén a kormányzat egy nagyszabású megegyezést szeretett volna elérni a szovjet diktátorral, Leonyid Brezsnyevvel. Hosszútávon a Helsinki Záróokmány emberi jogi rendelkezései még a folyamat legelkötelezettebb hívei és legkeményebb kritikusai (akik szerint a helsinki tárgyalások elárulták a Nyugat ügyét, és megerősítették a Szovjetunió pozícióját, különös tekintettel Kelet-Európa elnyomására) számára is váratlan eredményeket hoztak; a kommunista rendszerek bátor ellenzői ezeket a rendelkezéseket használták kardként és pajzsként akkor, amikor a Szovjetunió és annak kelet-európai vazallusai ellen harcoltak. A hetvenes években azonban a Szovjetunió és a nyugatnémet kormány (amely lelkesen követte az Ostpolitikot, ami a détente egy igen káros változata volt, hiszen még a legpuhább amerikai külpolitikánál is sokkal békülékenyebb volt a szovjetekkel) úgy értelmezte a Helsinki Záróokmányt, mint Kelet-Európa tartós szovjet elnyomásának zálogát, amelynek elfogadását követően a keleti befolyási övezet fennmaradása megkérdőjelezhetetlen tényé vált.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Robert G. Kaufman: *Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press), 291-294.



Szintén kiválóan illusztrálja a hetvenes évek amerikai külpolitikáját Mindszenty József magyar bíboros példája. Mindszenty a náci és szovjet totalitarianizmus kérlelhetetlen kritikusa volt, és azután, hogy 1956-tól tizenöt éven keresztül az Egyesült Államok budapesti nagykövetségén kapott menedéket, 1971-ben arra kényszerült, hogy elhagyja Magyarországot. Nixon és Kissinger úgy vélték, a bíboros kompromisszumoktól mentes nézetei akadályozzák az enyhülés politikáját, ezért elfogadták a szovjetekkel szövetséges kommunista magyar kormány feltételeit. Ez a lépés, amit a magyar kormány felé gyakorolt gesztusnak szántak, rendkívüli mértékben demoralizálta a magyar ellenzék világszerte, amely keményen küzdött, hogy politikai és vallásszabadságot vívjon ki magának.<sup>13</sup> Ez is bizonyítja, hogy a Nixon és Ford-kormányok nem igazán hittek az emberi jogok helyzetének javításában a Vasfüggöny mögött, és nem is gondolták, hogy ez fontos ügy lenne, különösen akkor, ha ez veszélyeztette a Szovjetunióval szemben folytatott déttente-ot, ami mindennél fontosabb szempont volt külpolitikai döntéseik meghozatala során.

A Carter-kormány még rosszabbul teljesített ezen a fronton. Regnálásának első három évében Amerika szövetségeseinek viszonylag apró emberi jogi visszaállításait kritizálta, de szemrehunyott a sokkal súlyosabb és rendszerszerű emberi jogi visszaélések felett, amelyeket az Egyesült Államok kommunista ellenségei követtek el. Carter elnök 1977. májusi beszédében a Notre Dame Egyetemen „a kommunizmustól való mértéktelen félelmünk” meghaladásáról beszélt, ennek érdekében olyan mértékben kívánt békülni kommunista ellenfeleinkkel, amiről Nixon, Kissinger vagy Ford még csak nem is álmodhattak volna.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Kissinger véleményét Mindszentyről lásd: NARA, Nixon Presidential Materials, Staff, National Security Files, Country Files Europe, Box 667. A Mindszenty-ügy történetéről magyarul lásd: Adriányi Gábor: *A Vatikán keleti politikája és Magyarország 1939-1978: A Mindszenty-ügy* (Budapest, Kairosz, 2004)

<sup>14</sup> Peter G. Bourne: *Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Post Presidency* (New York: Scribner's, 1997), 289.

Carter szándéka a kommunista vezetésű államok megbékítésére különösen kitűnik, ha a Magyarországgal folytatott politikájára vetünk egy pillantást. 1977-ben Carter elnök naivan úgy döntött, hogy „visszaadja” a Szent Koronát a magyar kormánynak, amely a Szovjetunió csatlósa volt. Ezzel Carter elismerte és hosszútávú legitimitációt biztosított egy illegitim, elnyomó rezsimnek, hiszen a Korona a magyar szuverenitás egyik legfőbb jelképe. Cyrus Vance külügyminiszter – aki egyik híres megszólalásában azt állította, hogy a Szovjetunió és az Egyesült Államok ambíciói és értékei nagyon hasonlóak – vezette az amerikai delegációt, amely a Koronát ünnepélyes kerete között átadta a magyar kormánynak a Parlamentben 1978. január 6-án.<sup>15</sup>

Martin Malia történész foglalta össze a legjobban a korlátlan enyhülés évtizedének külpolitikájának lényegét, amit Nixonhoz, Fordhoz és Carterhez köthetünk: „a Nyugat számára a déttente a hidegháború fokozatos meghaladásának eszköze volt, a Kelet számára pedig a fokozatos győzelem útja”.<sup>16</sup>

## II

Reagan elvi alapon utasította el mind a Nixon-Ford-Kissinger-féle enyhülést, mind a Carter-féle még békülékenyebb politikát. Mindenkinél jobban megértette (legalábbis az amerikai politikában senki más nem jutott el az ő következtetéseikig), hogy a szovjet kommunizmus velejéig romlott, és ebből következően le kell győzni. Úgy vélte, Kelet-Európa (és azon belül Magyarország) felszabadítása szükséges, bár nem elégséges feltétele a hidegháború

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<sup>15</sup> Kaufman: *Henry M. Jackson*, 351-53. A Szent Korona szerepéről az amerikai-magyar kapcsolatokban magyarul lásd: Glant Tibor: *A Szent Korona amerikai kalandja 1945-1978* (Debrecen: Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó)

<sup>16</sup> Martin Malia: *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991* (New York: Free Press, 1994), 376.